Union and the US formally setting out what had
been agreed, but both countries have, for the last
three decades, acted as if there had been one.
What then was the significance of the Cuban
missile crisis? What were the lessons drawn from
it by contemporaries and what assessment can be
made with hindsight?
How near had the US and Soviet Union come
to war, how near to the brink of a nuclear holo-
caust? Recent evidence reveals they were much
closer to catastrophe than was thought earlier.
While Kennedy had to assume some missiles and
even a few nuclear warheads could have reached
Cuba before the blockade was in force, the
Pentagon had badly underestimated the Soviet
military presence on the island. What might have
happened if Kennedy had given the final order to
invade Cuba on 28 October? That could have
brought into play another catastrophic risk the
Pentagon knew nothing about at the time. Not
only were eighteen medium-range missiles (1,050
miles) and twenty-four intermediate-range mis-
siles (2,100 miles), with some nuclear warheads
which were kept at a separate location, already on
the island, but in addition the Soviet commanders
in Cuba had available nuclear short-range (31
miles) Luna missiles. Soviet commanders were
debarred from using them. The orders to fire
them were secret, locked in a Kremlin safe. But
Soviet commanders had been given the freedom
to use non-nuclearmissiles if attacked. What if
they were confronted with a large seaborne inva-
sion and found themselves in a predicament to
defend themselves? They might as well have fired
the nuclear Luna missiles and decimated the
invading force. There would not have been time
to wait to find out what the Kremlin had decided
thousands of miles away. War would then have
been certain. Khrushchev must have been terri-
fied at this point that he would lose control, espe-
cially after a commander in Cuba had already shot
down a U-2 plane.
Most attention has been paid to Kennedy’s
handling of the crisis, less to the clever way
Khrushchev extricated the Soviet Union. He held
a weak hand of cards. The crisis had to be dif-
fused quickly. But Khrushchev did not capitulate
in panic. He extracted the valuable concession
that the US would not invade Cuba and extin-
guish communist rule by military force, in return
for the removal of the missiles. That at least had
fulfilled part of their purpose. The removal of the
US missiles in Turkey later on was an additional
face saver. How should Kennedy be judged? The
memoir literature of participants and the out-
pouring of academic work reveal a wide variety
of views. Broadly speaking, the almost wholly
favourable view of Kennedy’s handling was pop-
ularised by his brother in his book Thirteen Days,
the theme of which is that Kennedy’s flexible
responses and careful handling won for the US all
its essential interests – forcing the Russians to pull
back from challenging the US in the Western
hemisphere, and convincing them that the US
had the courage to stand up to nuclear blackmail.
This positive assessment has been challenged by
Republicans and revisionist historians. Nixon in
1964 blamed Kennedy for having ‘pulled defeat
out of the jaws of victory’. In other words,
Kennedy had the opportunity to call the Soviet
bluff and to overthrow Castro; instead, Castro
became secure. Kennedy had, in fact, appeased.
Crucial was Robert Kennedy’s role, based on his
brother’s trust. His frequent meetings with the
Soviet agent Georgi Bolshakov conveyed confi-
dential information of the president’s views and
soundings for terms of a diplomatic settlement.
The romantic Camelot representation of
Kennedy was not sustained in later years. There
is much that can be criticised in the handling
by the US of relations with Cuba. Operation
Mongoose was misconceived and a failure. But
to Kennedy’s credit a close analysis of the crisis
itself does not support the charge that he tried to
enhance his macho image. The evidence indicates
a cautious president weighing up all the possible
consequences of every move. Kennedy avoided
driving Khrushchev into a corner from which
there was no escape, and the world was able to
breathe a sigh of relief that the leaders in the
Kremlin had proved, not fanatical ideologues, but
rational pragmatists.
The US in the 1960s remained in a position
of overwhelming nuclear superiority. But the cre-
ation of a Soviet base with nuclear-armed missiles
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