In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square killings
in 1989, the Chinese communist leaders acted
like a caste of high priests. They alone could
delineate the right path to be followed by a billion
of their fellow Chinese. Yet since 1949 Chinese
history had been marked by abrupt changes. The
correct line at any one moment was determined
by the ascendant group among the elite. After
Mao’s death in 1976, no one carried enough
prestige to assume his mantle, though Deng
Xiaoping managed for a decade to exert overrid-
ing influence. When there was a change of policy,
the leader turned on his erstwhile supporters, who
were now revealed as deviationists, enemies or
counter-revolutionaries – exposed by the vigilance
of the victorious faction. The rest of China, from
the regional cadres to the humble peasant, was
coerced into following the new line. The impris-
onment of opponents was commonplace, as was
the execution of criminals.
This structure, however, in no way inhibited
power struggles among China’s leadership, which
occurred right through to the 1990s. But the ten-
sions and conflicts within the Politburo could
only be guessed at until the victory of one group
and leader brought them out into the open. The
party could ‘reform’ only from the top down.
Reform from below or outside the party – that
is, democracy – would undermine this self-
perpetuating system. So any radical change in the
way China was ruled had to be effected by the
leadership itself. For any Chinese leader, control
of the army was thus as vital as control of the
Politburo. The chairmanship of the Military
Affairs Commission was a key position of great
power; its occupant ensured that posts held under
him, such as the deputy director, the chief of staff
and the director of the Political Department, were
filled by his supporters. Yet the decades following
Mao’s death witnessed a transformation. One-
party control remained. Might not otherwise
China have succumbed again to regional disinte-
gration and chaos during the years of great
change. Yet year by year the people did gain more
freedoms, with one proviso; they could not fun-
damentally challenge party rule without risking
incarceration. Party leaders in big cities down to
small rural communities enjoy unchallenged
power. Corruption was rife despite constant cam-
paigns to check its spread and the threats of dra-
conian punishment. At first there were few signs
of a new dawn.Until his death in 1976, Mao continued to
dominate China whenever he chose to set the line
of policy to be followed. The violent changes from
1949 to 1976 reflected his perversion of the
Confucian doctrine of the Golden Mean – a
radical move would be followed by consolidation
and relaxation only to be succeeded by the next
step forward. The demise of the Red Guards in
1968, however, was succeeded not so much by
consolidation and relaxation as by a change in the
direction of the revolution. The student RedChapter 57
THE LAST YEARS OF MAO AND HIS HEIRS
THE REVOLUTION CHANGES COURSE