should find their rightful place. The secession
of Muslim Kashmir might prompt demands by
Muslims elsewhere in India for a plebiscite and,
ultimately, for the right of secession, thus under-
mining Indian unity. India was the stronger and
could afford to sit tight, in control of most of
Kashmir. Inside Kashmir the Indians suppres-
sed all opposition and stifled a growing demand
for independence. Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah,
Nehru’s friend, was arrested and imprisoned in
1953 for declaring that he found integration of
Kashmir into India an unacceptable solution. He
was not released until 1964.
Nehru’s India was treated with suspicion by
the US and the West. He followed a non-aligned
policy in the Cold War and was one of the archi-
tects of the non-aligned Bandung meeting in April
- He also enjoyed the support of Khrushchev
over Kashmir when the Soviet leader visited Delhi
in December 1955, and sought good relations
with communist China. China’s claim of sover-
eignty over Tibet caused India anxiety, but this
was dispelled by the Indian–Chinese ‘peaceful
coexistence’ agreement in 1954. When the
Chinese army invaded Tibet to put down a revolt
in 1959 and the Dalai Lama fled to India, rela-
tions between India and China deteriorated to
the point of armed conflict. To ensure better
control of Tibet, China had occupied an area of
Kashmir, the Asai Chin, and had constructed a
road through it from China to Tibet. When China
next attacked the ill-defined Chinese–Kashmir and
Indian frontier in October 1962, the Indian army
was woefully unprepared and was defeated. Nehru
had to ask for Western help, and since the oppo-
nent was now communist China received military
aid from the US, Britain and the Soviet Union.
In a show of strength China thereupon invaded
the frontier region of India but unilaterally with-
drew after securing the frontier it wanted. A cease-
fire in December 1962 in effect settled the issue
in China’s favour. Pakistan did not take advan-
tage of India’s military plight.
In need of Western aid, Nehru was now pres-
surised by the West to reach a settlement over
Kashmir. The West was anxious to ensure peace
on Pakistan’s eastern Indian frontier so that it
could concentrate on its Western alliance against
communism. But Realpolitikdictated otherwise.
In May 1964, Nehru died. Pakistan was now con-
vinced that only by war would it prove possible
to resolve the Kashmir issue and the frontier dis-
putes with India. The rearrest of Sheikh Abdullab
by the Indians made the conflict more certain. In
December 1964, India declared that Kashmir’s
accession to ‘the Union was final and irrevocable’,
a move that greatly angered Pakistan.
Western policies dictated by Cold War consid-
eration had been particularly uncertain on the
Indian subcontinent, veering from support for
Pakistan to supporting India after 1962 and
arming both sides. The Soviet Union also sought
to play an influential role by supporting India
with arms and aid during Khrushchev’s ambitious
period of world politics. India, meanwhile, always
regarded Pakistan as its principal enemy. As the
West after 1962 massively increased the armed
forces of India, Pakistan normalised relations with
the Soviet Union and drew closer to China again.
The poor performance of the Indian army
against the Chinese encouraged Pakistan to
believe it could now capture Kashmir. At the end
of August 1965 Pakistani troops struck across the
UN ceasefire line in Kashmir. On 6 September
the Indian army replied with an all-out war
against Pakistan. Two countries of the British
Commonwealth were now at war with each other.
Despite India’s military superiority, Pakistan
forces resisted effectively. For the second time the
Soviet Union and the US were agreed that a war
should be ended. Both were anxious to keep
China in check. The US did not help its ally,
Pakistan, and the Soviet Union did not help its
‘ally’, India. After only seventeen days, on 23
September, fighting ceased in accordance with a
Security Council resolution sponsored jointly
by the US and the Soviet Union, with Britain’s
full support. Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet prime
minister, achieved a diplomatic coup in bringing
Nehru’s successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and
Pakistan’s president, Ayub Khan, to a peace con-
ference at Tashkent in January 1966. In effect,
the Kashmir question was put on ice and India
and Pakistan agreed to withdraw their forces
behind the frontiers as they had existed before
the outbreak of the war. So ended the short