proved so strong, with widespread demonstra-
tions against it, that Washington agreed to revise
it in 1960. The changes were cosmetic, though
they allowed Japan a more equal voice; the
Japanese stressed their country’s residual sover-
eignty in the islands still militarily occupied by the
US. The revised treaty then came up for ratifica-
tion by the Diet. In April and May 1960 there
were unprecedented demonstrations and street
battles between the police and students and other
demonstrators. After unseemly scenes in the Diet
itself, the Liberal Democratic Party forced ratifi-
cation through. President Eisenhower was so
incensed by these strong anti-American feelings
that he called off an intended visit to Japan.
In 1970 the treaty was renewed again indefi-
nitely, subject to either country giving a year’s
notice to terminate it. The following year a
problem was solved that closely touched Japanese
pride. The Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa,
were returned to the Japanese in the spring of
1972, though US bases were allowed to remain
by agreement. But the territorial claim to four
islands of the southernmost part of the Kuril
island chain, occupied by the Russians, continued
to prevent good relations with the Russian
republic. Thus after 1951 the American alliance,
despite all the difficulties it caused in internal
Japanese politics, remained the sheet anchor of
Japan’s international position and defence.
It was Yoshida who had set Japan on that
course. The close relationship with the US has
enabled Japan to eschew extensive military preten-
sions, which could be seen as a threat to its Asian
neighbours and endanger political stability at
home; but the relationship is also based on a
recognition that the US is indispensable to
Japanese prosperity, mainly by providing the enor-
mous single market on which that prosperity is
based. The Japanese have on a few occasions fol-
lowed a more independent line from Washington
when their interests seemed to demand it. The
most notable instance has been in Japanese deal-
ings with the Arab oil states in the Middle East.
After suffering from the effects of the Arab oil
embargo in 1973, Japan made it clear to the Arab
states that it did not share Washington’s views on
Arab–Israeli issues and, indeed, supported the
Arab cause. In this way it bought the goodwill of
the Arab states, who continued the oil supply vital
to Japanese industry. During the Iran–Iraq war in
the 1980s the Japanese attempted to stay on good
terms with both sides, despite America’s estrange-
ment from Iran, especially following the seizure of
the American Embassy hostages. In 1990–1 dur-
ing the Gulf crisis, Japan again displayed no
enthusiasm for the US position. The Americans
have at times shown little sensitivity for Japanese
feelings; Nixon’s sudden opening to China and
the dropping of the Nationalists in Taiwan in the
1970s were undertaken without consulting Japan,
which had faithfully followed the Washington line
in refusing to recognise communist China. But
despite strains, especially in matters of Japanese–
US trade, the alliance has held and what later
became known as the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ contin-
ued to chart the course of Japanese policy, with
only minor modifications.
What then was the essence of that doctrine?
Yoshida believed he would satisfy America’s
demands on Japan as an ally by offering facilities
and bases and by restricting Japan’s own military
build-up. The Japanese forces were to be purely
defensive, forbidden to act except in defence of
the home islands, and Japan should forswear
development of nuclear weapons. In international
disputes its profile should be low. Japan had
finally turned its back on achieving greatness
through military conquest; all its energies were to
be concentrated on economic rehabilitation and
growth. For its own security, Japan had no choice
but to rely on its American ‘ally’, which was also
Japan’s most important trading partner. The
Yoshida strategy for Japan’s recovery was
accepted by the Liberal Democratic Party con-
sensus as the basis for Japan’s national policy and
long outlived Yoshida’s relinquishment of the
premiership in 1954. The doctrine was elaborated
and put into practice by Yoshida’s disciples and
protégés, for example Hayato Ikeda, who became
prime minister 1960–4, and Eisaku Sato, prime
minister 1964–72, and on into the 1970s and
1980s. Yoshida’s vision helped to make Japan
into an industrial and financial superpower,
second only to the US, during the second half of
the twentieth century.