The coalition of the left was exposed to the
hostility of the US as the Cold War developed. In
1948 the Communist Party was outlawed (though
not for long). During the next twenty-five years,
Chilean politics remained deeply divided, elec-
tions fiercely contested. The left could not muster
majority support and was kept out of power by a
coalition of the centre-right. Unemployment was
still held in check but the economy was stagnating
and inflation a constant problem. The benefits of
a substantial rise in copper prices from 1945 to
1955 were counterbalanced by an equally large fall
in production. In the 1960s Chile’s economic and
social problems multiplied and would have been
even worse without the support of Kennedy’s
Alliance for Progress. The problems of the rural
poor had not been effectively tackled; their influx
into the cities created massive new demands for
housing, education and employment, a common
experience in the underdeveloped regions of the
world. The small population (11.2 million in
1980) and its weak buying power could not sus-
tain large-scale home industries except in the most
basic goods, which poor people can afford to buy.
No Chilean government in the twentieth
century had, so far, found a solution to social and
economic problems: to the confrontation of polit-
ical parties and to the opposing interests of the
poor, the middle classes and the wealthy elite.
Any bold policy that attempted to breach the
status quo was immediately stymied by the oppo-
sition in the Chilean Congress. Yet, for just one
decade from 1964 to 1973, Chile’s political
leaders did try to break out of this cycle, and their
failure had tragic consequences.
As the presidential elections of 1964 ap-
proached, the communist–socialist alliance, led
by a veteran Marxist politician Salvador Allende,
looked like polling the most votes, though he
would not win an absolute majority; the parties of
the right were second in strength, and third was a
new Christian Democrat Party, pledged to imple-
ment thorough reforms and led by Eduardo Frei.
To prevent the left coming to power, the parties
of the right decided to back Eduardo Frei. Allende
called for a socialist revolution and Frei for a ‘rev-
olution in liberty’, which would not endanger
civic rights or rights to property. The Johnson
administration in Washington was determined to
do what it could to keep Allende from winning.
There must be only one ‘Cuba’ in the hemisphere.
The CIA channelled substantial funds to Frei’s
campaign, and he won easily. Nevertheless,
Allende, who had nearly won in 1958 in a three-
cornered contest, made a strong showing.
Frei’s policies were boldly reformist and he was
helped by a large influx of US aid amounting
to $327 million from 1964 to 1967. One long-
standing problem concerned the US copper con-
cerns. Frei did not nationalise them, but bought a
state share as part of a Chileanisation programme.
The state took an interventionist role in planning
the economy. Local industry was diversified; with
the country rich in timber, a paper industry was
established, and petrochemicals were developed.
Joining the Andean Pact with Peru, Bolivia,
Ecuador and Colombia created a larger market.
But the emphasis was on nationalism and inde-
pendence from foreign economic domination. A
more determined attempt at rural reform was
made and the break-up of the large estates was
begun. Between 1964 and 1967 copper prices
rose steeply, as did production. Then copper
prices fell again and inflation soared. There were
large-scale strikes met by violent repression. As the
1970 presidential elections approached, all classes
of society, for different reasons, were becoming
disenchanted with Frei’s economic reforms. With
the conservative right now putting up their own
candidate and the constitution preventing Frei
from standing again, it was clear that this was
Allende’s opportunity.
President Nixon and his national security
adviser, Henry Kissinger, regarded an Allende vic-
tory as totally unacceptable to the US. It would
end Cuba’s isolation and, they believed, mark the
beginning of an advance of Marxism in South
America. Subsequent US congressional investiga-
tions have revealed the extent of US intervention.
The Chilean military were encouraged by the CIA,
on instructions from Washington, to stage a coup
to prevent Allende assuming the presidency. But
the Chilean army commander-in-chief, General
René Schneider, stood by the constitutional
process and blocked the plot. The conspirators
thereupon decided to remove him: he was shot and