than Barre’s brutal rule. Although the 6 million
Somalis are almost unique in Africa in forming
one nation, all speaking one language and fol-
lowing the same religion, a Sunni branch of
Islam, clans had fought each other for centuries
over ownership of pastures, and Barre’s rule – far
from eradicating the clan rivalries – had only sup-
pressed them. Now, like a release of steam from
a pressure cooker, clans, local warlords and gangs
erupted in an orgy of civil conflict. The country
was awash in weapons.
The rest of the world was horrified by the tele-
vision reports sent from the capital, Mogadishu,
a ruined city in which over a million were seeking
some sort of shelter. The UN and relief agencies
sent in food aid to the starving population, but a
few hundred ‘blue berets’ – UN troops – were
totally inadequate to guard the supplies and to see
that emergency supplies reached the people. For
hundreds of thousands who had starved to death,
it was already too late.
Somalia presents a most pitiable face of con-
temporary Africa. Independence led to dictatorial
rule, corruption and the lavishing of scarce
resources on armaments. The end of dictatorship
was followed not by a transition to democracy but
by chaos, anarchy and ruin. A more determined
international effort, which got under way in the
autumn of 1992, endeavoured to save some 2
million Somalis from starvation. After the ill-
planned US intervention in October 1993 to
impose peace on the warring factions had failed
so humiliatingly, Somalia was left to its warlords.
If they cannot reach a peace between them, no
other nation was willing to risk its soldiers to
pacify the Somalian cauldron. The UN, the body
of last resort provided some aid. Despite all its
efforts Somalia has remained a fractured, broken
country.
Bordering the Red Sea to the north-west of
Ethiopia lies the Sudan, where starving peoples
from the Tigray and Eritrea found refuge. In one
of the most extraordinary migrations thousands of
Ethiopian Jews, the Falashas, also crossed into the
Sudan (1983–4) on their secret journey to Israel.
The Sudan provides the main route through
which aid can be channelled to Eritrea and
Tigray, but it is not itself a stable country polit-
ically or ethnically. The south is African and vehe-
mently opposes the spread of the Muslim religion
and law, which the Arab north of the country
seeks to impose. When the Sudan gained inde-
pendence from Britain in January 1956, para-
mount British consideration had been to prevent
Nasser’s Egypt from dominating it, but it was
left to the Sudanese to decide the issue. A rebel-
lion in the south in the summer of 1955, moti-
vated by the fear that all power would in practice
be transferred to the north, was repressed and did
not delay independence. Britain was in a hurry
and failed to insist on safeguards for the south.
British Middle Eastern policy required strong,
unified nations, not weak political divisions that
might be exploited by the Soviet Union.
After a short period of multi-party government
in the Sudan, the military seized power in 1958
and ruled for the next six years. General Abboud’s
regime followed a harsh policy of Arabisation,
established Koranic schools in the south and
expelled Christian missionaries. In 1962 a civil
war began that was to cause destruction and great
1
WAR AND FAMINE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 751
The Horn of Africa, 1987–2000
Population (millions) GDP per head, Purchasing
Power Parity (US$)
1987 2000 2000
Ethiopia 44.8 62.9 660
Somalia 5.7 8.8 590
Sudan 23.1 31.1 1,500
Libya 4.1 5.3 10,000
