Communist Party was losing its grip. It is likely
that the alarmed Kremlin signalled the need for a
Polish (rather than Soviet) crackdown, especially as
the Soviet Union had become embroiled in the
civil war in Afghanistan. Even so, in Poland there
was much talk of a possible Soviet intervention.
General Jaruzelski, austere and colourless, pre-
empted any such move by declaring martial law in
December 1981 and by establishing a communist
military regime. The army proved reliable and,
even though the Communist Party lost so much
credibility that it could never recover, Jaruzelski
imposed a martial peace. Solidarity leaders were
arrested or driven underground. But the Jaruzelski
decade could not solve Poland’s fundamental
problems nor cow the spirit of Solidarity. In cen-
tral Europe Soviet dominance was upheld with dif-
ficulty. Cracks were showing – but no one
expected that the whole system would disintegrate
before the 1980s had ended.
Brezhnev was anxious to present a peaceful
image of Soviet intentions. The missile and space
programmes were costly but only by catching up
could the Soviet Union treat with the US as an
equal partner and perhaps limit this huge drain on
resources. Anything that extended the capabilities
of conventional warfare or that raised tensions
would not only impede the attempts to halt the
continued increase of nuclear armament expendi-
ture, but provoke an inexorable rise in the cost of
conventional weapons as NATO increased its own
military preparedness. Thus Brezhnev welcomed
West Germany’s readiness to promote relaxed rela-
tions with the East German regime and to reassure
Poland that its new western frontier, which
enclosed within Poland former German territories,
would never be changed by force. West Germany
became an essential trading partner of East
Germany. That was incentive enough for the com-
munist regime. But the easing of movement
between the two Germanies and an effective settle-
ment of confrontation in Berlin by four-power
treaties in 1971 and 1972 (which reaffirmed
Western rights in the city) made a real contribution
to a more peaceful international atmosphere. The
Federal Republic also recognised the DDR.
This reluctance to become directly involved in
other countries’ affairs during the 1970s was par-
ticularly marked in Asia, until the invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979. The develop-
ment of friendly relations between the Soviet
Union and India in the 1970s and 1980s is one
of the few success stories of Soviet foreign policy.
But it did not come cheaply. The Soviet Union
supplied substantial military and economic aid.
And good relations with India meant, almost
inevitably, bad relations with Pakistan. These
were exacerbated by Brezhnev’s decision – there
were rumours in Moscow that he was drunk at
the time – to invade Afghanistan in December
- That invasion was, however, a logical
extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine to a neigh-
bouring state whose communist regime had to be
maintained against the revolt of Muslim funda-
mentalists, even though they enjoyed wide
popular support.
A successful coup to place an efficient Afghan
communist puppet in power supported by a brief
intervention was what the Kremlin had antici-
pated. Instead the Soviet armed forces had to be
reinforced until they exceeded 100,000. The
mujahideen in their mountain strongholds could
not be wiped out by helicopter rocket attacks.
The communist Afghan army and Soviet troops
controlled the cities and the main lines of com-
munication, but in the rugged countryside and
mountains the mujahideen, fortified by American
weapons and by rear bases in Pakistan, proved
unbeatable. Non-combatants streamed into refu-
gee camps in Pakistan, thus relieving the fighting
units of their care. For Brezhnev the long war was
a treble disaster. For the privates conscripted to
fight in Afghanistan and for their families, the
endless struggle (which was to bring 60,000 casu-
alties) against largely hidden enemies far away
from home was a heavy and unpopular burden.
For the Red Army generals the war was an oppor-
tunity to try out tactics and weapons and to
demand more and better tanks, guns and planes.
These could not be denied them, and Brezhnev
had to find and divert resources to meet new
military needs. Finally, Washington’s failure to
understand Soviet motivation put pay, at least for
a time, to detente, and impeded – in critical areas,
halted – Western technological assistance so badly
needed in the USSR.
1
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