called for a general strike and popular support.
But the response was patchy. The miners of the
Kuznetsk Basin beyond the Urals said they would
strike, but only in St Petersburg did the mayor
Anatoly Sobchak provide decisive support.
The fate of the coup would be decided in
Moscow. Yeltsin’s call for the people of Moscow
to defend the Russian parliament building proved
decisive. Before his appeal no more than 200
people had gathered in front of the White House.
Millions of Muscovites simply went about their
business, fatalistically accepting the coup. But
Yeltsin’s courage proved infectious. By Monday
night there were hundreds more. The hours
passed, and it became evident that some elements
in the army and KGB were not behind the coup.
The expected attack on the White House did not
materialise that night.
By Tuesday night not thousands but tens of
thousands had gathered to protect the White
House, and barricades were thrown up. The
young conscript tank crews were bewildered. It
was clear that, even if ordered to do so, they
could not be relied upon to fire on the people.
Around one barricade there was a scuffle that
claimed three victims, the only deaths in Moscow.
Some tanks defected and joined the people in
defence of the Russian parliament. Tuesday mid-
night passed without the expected assault on the
White House materialising. Somewhat belatedly
the West on Tuesday condemned the coup out-
right. On Wednesday it was all over. Kryuchkov
and Yazov tried to save themselves by fleeing
from Moscow to negotiate with Gorbachev in the
Crimea; instead they were arrested there. All the
principal plotters were soon in prison. Only Boris
Pugo escaped – by committing suicide.
On Thursday, early in the morning, Gorbachev
returned to Moscow airport, to be met by Yeltsin
and a large crowd of well-wishers. But Gorbachev
was a defeated man. Yeltsin manoeuvred shrewdly,
and made no attempt to replace Gorbachev ille-
gally. Over the next three months he eroded the
Soviet Union until there was no job left for its
president. After his return Gorbachev had lost the
initiative by lining himself up behind the totally
discredited Communist Party. Yeltsin had already
broken their power in the Russian Federation and
he now finished the job, shutting down the party
in Moscow altogether. Belatedly, on Saturday 24
August, Gorbachev announced his resignation as
general secretary and recommended that the
Central Committee dissolve itself, thus decapitat-
ing the party. It was finished. Hated party statues
were toppled from their pedestals. But one relic
survived: no one could bring themselves to
remove Lenin from the mausoleum.
Yeltsin went on to sidetrack Gorbachev, who
was warning of the dangers facing the Soviet
Union if cooperation between the republics could
not be secured by a new Union treaty. Yeltsin
went ahead on his own, asserting Russian inde-
pendence of action, and in October 1991 pro-
posed a separate and radical economic reform
programme that was to lead to a free-market econ-
omy. The plan had been masterminded by the
young economist Yegor Gaidar and his team.
Yeltsin also began separate negotiations with the
Ukraine and Belorussia to ensure economic coop-
eration between the republics. The formal preser-
vation of the Soviet Union still had some
advantages for Yeltsin’s Russian Federation as a
framework for essential trade interchange, espe-
cially with the Ukraine. But when, on 1 December
1991, the Ukraine in a referendum overwhelm-
ingly voted for independence the old Soviet
Union ceased to have much purpose. A week later
1
THE SOVIET UNION, CRISIS AND REFORM 807
Yeltsin, 1991. © Associated Press, AP
