Argentinian junta invaded the Falkland Islands,
Margaret Thatcher did not hesitate. Regardless of
the cost of defending a barren island with more
sheep on it than people, a principle was at stake:
Britain had to respond when its territory was
attacked. The Falkland islanders were British and
had rejected any form of Argentine sovereignty.
If Britain allowed itself to be expelled by the
Argentinians its credibility as a significant power
would be gravely damaged. Unlike the Suez
adventure, this was an enterprise that attracted
overwhelming public support.
Just a year later, in June 1983, Margaret
Thatcher fought her second election. Helped by
the Falklands victory, and by the tough leadership
she had displayed, the Conservatives won a land-
slide victory with a parliamentary majority of 188
over the Labour Party, whose share of the vote
had sunk to 27.6 per cent. The Labour Party was
severely handicapped by two issues: its promise to
take Britain out of the European Community if
elected, and its adherence to unilateral nuclear
disarmament. The Conservatives had a com-
manding majority of 144 over all other parties
combined. The new Alliance, at this, its first test,
was closely behind Labour, with 25.4 per cent of
the vote, but the electoral system gave them only
twenty-three MPs. The question remained open:
would a three-party contest now become the
norm, or would the Alliance or Labour emerge as
the winners in a resumption of two-party politics?
Thatcher’s second administration, from 1983
to 1987, saw no let-up in the attempt radically
to reshape Britain’s economy. Public expenditure
and the budget deficit would be reduced.
Privatisation of state-run industries would be
accelerated: British Telecom, British Airways and
British Gas provided a lucrative sales programme.
The administration was cautious on defence,
increasing expenditure and supporting the
American cruise missile installation on bases in
Britain. Law and order and strengthening the
police were also high on the list, while further
restrictions were imposed on the unions in the
Trade Union Reform Act. Even so, it was from
the National Union of Miners, led by Arthur
Scargill, that the government faced its most
serious threat. The miners had brought down
Heath; could they now bring down Thatcher,
who was not only determined to curb the unions
in general but ready to take on the miners? The
new National Coal Board’s head was Ian
MacGregor, who had gained a reputation for
ruthless efficiency by slimming down and ration-
alising the steel industry, in the process defeating
the steel workers; his appointment to the NCB
by the government persuaded the coal miners to
strike for fear of pit closures and job losses. The
strike began in March 1984 and ended in defeat
for the miners a year later. In the course of it,
there were many ugly confrontations between
miners and police. But the government was fully
prepared, with large coal stocks, and in any case
the Nottingham and Derby miners refused to
strike, so dooming the National Union of Miners
to defeat. Despite a great deal of sympathy for
the hardship suffered by the miners and their fam-
ilies, there was little nationwide support for the
leadership of the NUM or the trade union bosses.
The government’s economic policies, however,
continued to be heavily criticised. Unemployment
rose to over 3 million, and spending cuts put the
government at loggerheads with local authorities.
Admiration for Thatcher’s composure was again
aroused in October 1984, this time after the IRA’s
bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton, where
the Cabinet was staying during the Conservative
Party Conference. But her personal style of lead-
ership was also now meeting mounting criticism,
culminating in January 1986 in the walkout from
her Cabinet of the popular defence secretary
Michael Heseltine. The rights and wrongs of their
quarrel were less important than Heseltine’s accu-
sation that Margaret Thatcher no longer accepted
the normal practices of Cabinet government, that
her behaviour represented a breakdown of the
constitutional process. These were the first warn-
ing signals that approval for strong leadership
could turn into general resentment of ‘bossiness’
and ‘nannying’. It was also noted that Thatcher
had the irritating habit of referring to herself
with a royal ‘we’.
With an election approaching, public spending
restrictions were eased, a policy made more feasi-
ble by the rise in oil-tax revenues and by indus-
trial growth since the low of 1981. Inflation had
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