A History of the World From the 20th to the 21st Century

put forward more proposals. An early plan tried to
preserve the federal structure of Yugoslavia. This
had to be abandoned, however, when in January
1992, on the insistence of Germany, the Euro-
pean Community reluctantly recognised the
independence of Croatia and Slovenia. There is no
space or need to describe in detail all the media-
tion efforts that were launched over the following
three years. They all failed because Serbia and
Croatia wanted to enlarge their states at each
other’s or Bosnia’s expense. The United Nations
and the European Community insisted that their
mission was ‘peacekeeping’; Croatia and Serbia,
however, were determined to fight. As the UN
and the EC were unwilling to use force, what was
left? In September 1991 an arms embargo was
imposed by the UN on all parties in the conflict,
regardless of whether they were victims or perpe-
trators of aggression. The warring parties attended
peace negotiations chaired by international medi-
ators but in reality they followed their own agen-
das. Clearly the wars could continue indefinitely in
the absence of outside intervention. But Britain,
France and other European countries could not
simply watch as millions were driven from their
homes and hundreds of thousands were exposed
to starvation and death. A relief force bringing
humanitarian aid was organised under the UN
flag. The ‘blue helmets’ had strict orders not to
take sides: they depended on the permission of the
aggressors to bring aid to starving people.
Meanwhile the US washed its hands of what it saw
as Europe’s problem. American intervention as
part of another UN mission in Somalia was prov-
ing disastrous, and the Clinton administration
refused to commit US ground troops to Bosnia –
Congress would not then have sanctioned it –
though a small detachment was sent to the
Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, which had
seceded without entering the conflict. Clinton
called for NATO air strikes and for the lifting of
the arms embargo to help the Bosnians. But
Britain and France rejected these proposals: the
lives of their soldiers in the UN force would be at
risk; hopelessly outnumbered, they had been sent
in with inadequate means to defend themselves.
Indeed, had the Serbians decided to attack the
international peacekeepers it would have been dif-

ficult to extricate them. Thus the West, relying

largely on bluff, had placed the UN contingents in

an impossible position: for a short time they actu-

ally became hostages. The result was paralysis for

three years and Western disunity.

The most bloody and cruel phase of the conflict

began when the wars spread to Bosnia. The pres-

ident of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, a devout

Muslim who had been elected in 1990, recog-

nised that, with the European Community’s

recognition of independent Croatia and Slovenia

in January 1992, all hopes of sustaining a federal

Yugoslavia were lost. Radical Serbian and Croat

minorities were already forming autonomous

communities within his country. In January 1992

the Bosnian Serbs, led by a professor of psychia-

try, Radovan Karadzic, proclaimed their own

independent republic within Bosnia, receiving

military help from Milosˇevic ́. Four hundred thou-

sand Muslims were driven out of the Bosnian self-

styled Republika Srpska.

Serbia was in an overwhelming position of

strength: the JNA was for all practical purposes

now under Serbian control. Although the army

had formally withdrawn from Bosnia (in May

1992) the Bosnian-Serb soldiers remained be-

hind, well armed and professionally trained.

Izetbegovic’s one hope was international help

after April 1992, when the European Community

also recognised Bosnia’s independence. But

beyond humanitarian aid and ‘mediation’ none

was forthcoming. However, on 30 May 1992,

appalled by the atrocities committed by the Serbs

in their campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ the UN

Security Council imposed sanctions isolating

Serbia and its satellite partner Montenegro, which

had remained in a rump Yugoslavia. These meas-

ures crippled Serbia’s economy but put no

immediate pressure on Milosˇevic ́ to withdraw.

Conferences in London, discussions at the UN,

advice from the Clinton administration, all fell

short of recommending intervention by force.

Britain and France were the biggest contributors

to the UN force in Bosnia, bringing supplies of

food and medicines to cities and towns suffering

Serb bombardment; without a doubt this human-

itarian effort saved tens of thousands of lives. In

920 GLOBAL CHANGE: FROM THE 20th TO THE 21st CENTURY