independence until the beginning of the 1980s
were ineffectual and the country remained eco-
nomically dependent on France. The FLN then
embarked upon economic reform and, in 1989,
introduced a multi-party system. But these aus-
terity measures caused hardship which, following
the general Islamic revival, contributed to the
success of a powerful new movement in Algeria,
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).
In the June 1990 municipal and regional elec-
tions the FIS defeated the FLN in the majority of
councils, raising fears that the general election
scheduled for June 1991, would produce an
Iranian-style revolution. It was postponed until
December when, despite government manipula-
tion, the FIS won easily and routed the FLN. In
January 1992 the military intervened and abro-
gated the election results. A few weeks later the
FIS was banned. It was the end of the democratic
process and the beginning of a bloody civil war.
FIS leaders were arrested and their newspapers
and publicity banned. Radical military groups
were formed on the fringes of the FIS, terroris-
ing Algiers and the surrounding villages. Their
trademark was to kill all the inhabitants, even the
children, by slitting their throats. The army
appeared unable or unwilling to defend the pop-
ulation. The military regime tried to gain legiti-
macy by holding parliamentary elections in June
1997 but these were boycotted by the FIS. The
carnage continued, and claimed tens of thousands
of victims.
Since 1992 more than 77,000 killings were
committed by terrorist groups and their military.
No UN or outside intervention stopped the
killings and France did not intervene either. In
May 2002 President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, elected
in 1999, called new parliamentary elections,
which he described as a ‘matter of life and death’
for the country. Moderate Islamic parties com-
peted, five parties boycotted them. Bouteflika
won but the turnout was low and the Algerian
regime backed by the generals inspired little con-
fidence that it could help Algeria’s economic
decline, or advance the country to greater democ-
racy and heal the violent internal dissension.
Algeria, a country on the doorstep of Europe,
is a challenge to human rights. The internal vio-
lence deters foreign investors. In the new millen-
nium there is only the hope that the country’s
decline can be reversed.
How much longer in the new century can funda-
mental change be held up in the Middle East? The
rulers of the Arab nations of the regions will resist
a transformation according to the American model
of democracy. Nowhere is this more true than in
Iran. Ultimate power rests with the supreme leader
Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, the successor of the Imran
Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic
Republic who overthrew the secular Shah. The
demand for change from mullah rule is voiced by
the democratically elected parliament, the majlis
and Muhammed Khatami, chosen by the popular
vote of the majority of the people in 1997 and
- In 1999 a student-led outburst of protest
was violently suppressed. The mullahs became
more circumspect in 2003 with the shadow of the
US threatening Iran, one of the three countries
listed by George W. Bush on the ‘axis of evil’. After
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein they have taken
care not to provoke the US openly by appeals to
the Shias in Iraq. With the return of Shia clerics
who found refuge in Iran, the Shias are an import-
ant political factor in the future of Iraq, but the
majority do not wish to copy the Iranian model
knowing in any case that the US would not toler-
ate the setting up of an Islamic republic abusing
human rights. Iran is poised on a delicate balance.
In the new millennium sooner or later the mullahs
will not be able to retain their grip on the levers of
power and the lives of the people. They have been
careful to allow the voice of opposition to be chan-
nelled through Khatami, a cleric and reformer as a
safety valve for the popular discontent of a genera-
tion that has grown up since the revolution of
- But through the uncompromising judicial
system applying sharia law, they have periodically
cracked down on individuals and on street protests
they deem in danger of getting out of hand.
Khatami has accepted repression. He only wishes
to change the balance not to overthrow the Islamic
republic. His lack of success in bringing about any
fundamental change, however, is increasing the
possibility of a violent end. Khatami’s second term
of office – only two are permitted – ends in 2006.
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