thought artillery was the key to winning battles. Although an expert
marksman could get off five shots a minute, the average was only one or
two. Slowness was compounded by inaccuracy. At a range of 225 yards
only 25% of shots could be expected to hit their target, 40% at 150 yards
and only 6o% even as close as 75 yards. French infantrymen were
generally poor shots because musketry practice was .neglected, partly to
save ammunition, partly to avoid casualties from burst barrels but most of
all out of a doctrinaire conviction that killing by shot was the job of the
artillery; the infantry went in to 'mop up' with cold steel. Even so, deaths
from the bayonet were few: its impact tended to be psychological rather
than actual, causing fear but not death. On the other hand, at ranges less
than fifty yards ('whites of eyes' range) even the 1777 musket was deadly
and could produce horrific casualties.
When it came to individual weaponry, Napoleon laid most emphasis on
the rifled carbines -lighter, smaller-calibred weapons- issued to snipers,
sharpshooters, skirmishers, voltigeurs and non-commissioned officers.
Dense clouds of these skirmishers, in numbers sometimes amounting to
regimental strength, would engage and harass the enemy while the main
column approached with drawn bayonets. If the morale of the main body
of attackers was low, an elite grenadier company would be placed in the
rear to urge others forward; if morale was good, the elite corps would lead
the right wing into battle.
Napoleon planned his battles to maximize the advantages of technology
and minimize the disadvantages of infantry and muskets. First he would
unleash a devastating bombardment from his big guns to inflict heavy
losses and lower resistance. While this barrage was going on, snipers and
voltigeurs used the cover to advance within musketry range in hopes of
picking off officers and spreading confusion. The next stage was a series
of carefully coordinated cavalry and infantry assaults. The cavalry would
attempt to brush aside the enemy's horse and then force his inf antry to
form square; French infantry then moved up to close quarters to prevent
the enemy in square from reforming in line. The square was usually
proof against cavalry charges but it left those forming it highly vulnerable
to an infantry attack, since men drawn up in a square or rectangular
formation could fire only in a limited number of directions, enabling the
advancing French columns to come to close quarters without sustaining
the withering fire and unacceptable casualties normal when engaging an
enemy drawn up in line. The final stage came when the infantry forced a
gap in the enemy lines: horse artillery would widen the breach; and then
French cavalry would sweep forward for the breakthrough. Time and
again the Austrian method of relying on infantry unprotected by cover or
marcin
(Marcin)
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