Switzerland. Also, Moreau was instructed to release a division from the
Rhine Army which, reinforced by French units in Switzerland, would
then make a final 12-day forced march of 192 miles from Zurich to
Bergamo to take the Austrians in the rear on the Po just when they were
facing the main French army.
The most successful military strategies are the simplest and most
economical ones. On the Austrian campaign of 18oo Napoleon was
creating problems for himself by the extreme and needless complexity of
his ideas. Military historians have identified at least six major errors in
the strategy for the second Italian campaign. First, the new Italian plan
needed two separate lines of operation while the original German scheme
needed just one. Secondly, a victory on the Po would not meet France's
war aims; it would be 1796 all over again, with an endless series of battles.
Thirdly, it was unlikely that Moreau could defeat Kray decisively in the
first place. Fourthly, the Austrian army selected for destruction was not
the enemy's main one. Fifthly, success depended on Moreau's full
cooperation in releasing Lecourbe and his men at precisely the right
moment. Si xthly, and most importantly, the plan assumed the Austrians
would be purely reactive and have no strategies of their own. But the
Austrians surprised Napoleon in two ways. They launched an unexpected
offensive against Massena and the weak French force at Genoa. And,
amazingly, they decided to make Italy their main theatre of operations.
The Austrians achieved signal early success. They penned Massena up
in Genoa, and cut him off from his right (under Suchet) and his left
(under Soult). With the help of the Royal Navy, by the third week of
April they had Genoa tightly blockaded, leaving Napoleon's strategy in
tatters unless Massena, by some miracle, could hold out until the First
Consul arrived. At this stage, however, Napoleon had not even decided
which of the Alpine passes he should use: should it be the Great St
Bernard, the Simplon or the St Gotthard?
Things were not going well for the French in any sector. Berthier
proved to have been a mistaken appointment, so that Napoleon virtually
had to take over the direction of the Army of the Reserve. He was
reduced to going against his own principle of concentration of force by
sending small French detachments through other passes so as not to clog
up the Great St Bernard. Nor was congestion the only problem, for the
Alpine passes were not clear until the end of May, so that the men still
had to contend with ice, snow and avalanches. Moreau, too, delayed
unconscionably before opening the spring campaign in Germany. And
even when he drove the Austrians back to Ulm, he still proved reluctant
marcin
(Marcin)
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