rational objective - the invasion of England - being overwhelmed by the
'Oriental complex'?By r8o5 the European powers had lost patience with Napoleon and
English gold gave them the necessary push to go to war. Even so, the
genesis of the third coalition was complex, with Austria and Russia
actuated by very different considerations. Austria was fu rious with
Napoleon fo r his annexation of Genoa, Piedmont and Elba, his
conversion of the Cisalpine Republic into a kingdom (with himself as
King), his occupation of Naples and his provocative aping of Charle
magne in May r 8 os, when he crowned himself Emperor ofltaly in Milan
cathedral, using the Lombardy crown. All of this was not only contrary to
the Treaty of Luneville but exposed the hollowness of Napoleon's
assurances, given on each fn:sh annexation, that this was positively his
last territorial ambition. Further offence was given by Napoleon's so
called 'mediation' in Switzerland, and this turned to outrage when the
French Emperor proceeded to reconstruct Germany: he reduced the
Holy Roman Empire from 350 princelings to just 39 and made himself
the guarantor of this trivial remainder.
Talleyrand once more warned Napoleon that Austria would not stand
idly by and see her spheres of influence in both Germany and Italy so
blatantly truncated. He argued that peace with Austria was the lodestone
by which the Emperor should steer his foreign policy; otherwise France
would be involved in a never-ending cycle of European warfare. He
proposed getting Austria to acquiesce in the loss of Italy by offering her
Moldavia and Wallachia at the mouth of the Danube. This would have a
twofold effect: it would detach Austria from Russia and link Vienna with
France in the drive towards Turkey and the East. But Napoleon wanted
none of it.
Russian feelings towards France were even more complexly layered by
r8os. On paper the natural geopolitical impulse should have brought
Russia and Britain to blows. The Russians coveted the Baltic states ·and
wanted a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean fr om which to attack
its traditional enemy, Turkey; there were persistent demands, which
Napoleon encouraged, that Russia be allowed to occupy Malta. But
Britain did not want the Baltic supplies of timber, tar and hemp, crucial
fo r the Royal Navy, in Russian hands, and it was a tradition of British
fo reign policy to support the 'Sick Man of Europe'. Moreover, British
commercial interests were adamant that Malta could not be given up.
Additionally, Czar Alexander I, on acceding in r8or, encouraged a
culture of Anglomania and made it plain that he intended to fu lfil the