other corps. Napoleon felt confident that he could now cut Bennigsen off
from his base at Konigsberg, where the Russians kept their main stores
and arms dumps.
But the Emperor's first efforts seemed to presage another Eylau. He
engaged the Russians at Heilsberg on ro June, but an indecisive, slugging
battle resulted, lasting well into the darkness of a midsummer evening. By
his inexplicable frontal assaults on well-defended positions Napoleon
simply produced the consequence that the French lost ro-rr ,ooo men
(against Russian losses of some 8,ooo) without gaining any significant
advantage. Finally Napoleon did what he should have done that morning
instead of offering battle, and manoeuvred to threaten the Russian
communications, forcing Bennigsen to withdraw from his strong
defensive position on a hillside. As at Eylau Napoleon was left in
possession of the battlefield and, also as at Eylau, he presented Heilsberg
as a victory in his official bulletin.
Trying to read Russian intentions, Napoleon guessed that Bennigsen
would cross the Aile on the left bank farther down river at Friedland. But
Bennigsen's plans were more ambitious. Learning that Lannes's corps
was marching in detachments on Friedland and was dangerously isolated
from the rest of the French army, he gave orders to construct pontoon
bridges so that his army could cross and wipe out Lannes. Unhappily for
him, by the time he got the first ro,ooo of his men to the far side of the
river (r3 June), Lannes had already received reinforcements, notably a
large body of cavalry under Grouchy.
Bennigsen opened the battle just before dawn on 14 June with a huge
artillery barrage but inexplicably did not press his great local superiority.
By 9 a.m. the French still only had 9,ooo infantry and 8,ooo cavalry and
there was a 45,000-strong Russian army on the other side of the river.
Napoleon sent Lannes orders to lure this army over the river and pin it
while the rest of the Grande Armee moved up. While Bennigsen dithered,
more and more reinforcements reached Lannes. At 9.30 Berthier arrived
to swell Lannes's numbers to 35,000 and half an hour later there was
further stiffening from another 5,000 French troops.
Unaccountably Bennigsen still made no move. Soon after midday
Napoleon arrived on the spot and assumed command. The consensus of
his staff was that the best plan would be to wait until next day, for by
then the heroes of Eylau, Murat and Davout, would be present and the
French would have an overwhelming superiority in numbers. The
Emperor demurred. Two factors weighed with him. Ever superstitious,
and recalling how Austerlitz on 2 December had mirrored his coronation
day a year before, he decided that 14 June, the date of Marengo, was a
marcin
(Marcin)
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