Napoleon: A Biography

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supply infrastructure. By early I809 the Austrian commanders were
itching for war.
The cautious Emperor Francis was doubtful. To the war party, who
argued that England would help with troops and subsidies and there was
a good chance that Prussia and Russia would be drawn in, the Emperor
answered that Czar Alexander had made it plain he would not go beyond
neutrality. As for England, she would consult her own interests as ever.
The Emperor and his advisers had tried to drive a hard bargain with the
British over subsidies for fighting Napoleon but, in financial terms, they
had gone a bridge too far. London curtly refused the extravagant
Austrian demand for a down payment of £z.s million to cover
mobilization and a fu rther £5 million fo r each year her armies fought.
Emperor Francis was finally 'bounced' into war in February I809 when it
was put to him that any further delay might enable Napoleon's
Continental Blockade to work, in which case there would be no English
subsidies.
As a result of the Austrian declaration of war Napoleon faced his most
difficult military task since the Marengo campaign. The Austrian army
was far better than in I8os, but his own Grand Army was far worse.
Behind him was an insurgent Spain and a British presence in Portugal;
ahead of him was an armed and restless Germany; and his home base was
moody, uncertain and treacherous Paris, with men like Fouche and
Talleyrand waiting in the wings. However, he was not entirely
unprepared. At the back of his mind he had long been expecting this
blow to fall and, in anticipation, had conscripted the necessary manpower
to deal with the threat. In I8o8 a senatus consultum called up 8o,ooo more
conscripts from the classes of I 8o6, I 8o7, I 8o8 and I 809, and in
December I8o8 a further 8o,ooo from the class of I8Io were called up
two years in advance. The unexpected losses in Spain meant that a
further uo,ooo of the class of I8Io were called up in the new year of
I8o9.
The original Austrian plan was for a surprise attack on the Rhine,
hoping to spark a rebellion in the Confederation of the Rhine which
would suck Prussia into the conflict. But Archduke Charles finally
reverted to a more traditional strategy: there would be a three-pronged
attack, with the main army punching through Bavaria, Archduke John
invading Italy and Archduke Ferdinand taking out the Grand Duchy of
Warsaw in the rear. The tripartite assault was the first Austrian mistake;
the second was the assumption that Napoleon lacked the manpower to
fight on all these fronts and continue campaigning in Spain. Perhaps
Bonaparte encouraged the false optimism by an unreal, almost Neroesque,

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