opposed to 36% in I9I4-I8), but even this figure featured in popular
perception as a universal call-up.
Elsewhere in the Empire the percentage was higher. All the allies were
obliged to provide a contingent for the Grande Armee in proportion to
population, but Napoleon continually increased his demand for troops
between I8o8 and I812. The respective figures for Westphalia are
instructive: I6 infantry battalions, I2 cavalry squadrons and 3 artillery
batteries in I8o8 but 29, 28 and 6 respectively in I812. Similar figures
from other parts of the Empire show the same trend. In I 8o8 the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw provided infantry, cavalry and artillery in the amount
of 36 battalions, 26 squadrons and I2 batteries, but by I812 this had risen
to 6o, 70 and 20 respectively; for Wiirttemberg the corresponding figures
were I2, I2 and 3 in I8o8 and 20, 23 and 6 in I812. In addition to
regulars, the Empire had to raise and supply militia and national guards.
At the peak of Napoleon's campaigns, in I812, Italy supplied I2I,ooo
regulars, Bavaria I Io,ooo (as against the original promised levy of
3o,ooo), Warsaw 89,000, Saxony 66,ooo, Westphalia 52,000 and Berg
I3,200. The minimum total of foreign conscripts serving in the Grand
Army (not necessarily all at the same time) was 72o,ooo, but some experts
believe the true figure may have been almost one million men.
Resentment at this huge level of conscription was both individual and
collective. Individually, those who served realized that their chances of
survival were not that great. Of the 52,000 Westphalians only I8,ooo
survived and only I7,000 out of a 29,000-strong contingent from Baden.
Conscription also left the wives and families of these men in destitution.
A vicious circle was set up whereby young men, criminalized by the
poverty resulting from the drafting of their fathers, were themselves
dragooned into the ranks as punishment. Collectively, each locality in the
Empire had to bear the massive costs of keeping these armies in being.
Napoleon promised France he would make his wars pay for themselves,
but he made no such promise to the satellites, and anyway his tactic of
self-financing campaigns did not always work, notably in Spain and
Russia. Even conquered Portugal paid only seven millions of the one
hundred million francs levied as reparations after the I 807 campaign.
To maintain his armies Napoleon was forced into deficit spending:
military expenditure accounted for 40% of the total French budget in
I8o6 and 58% by I8I3. In an economy where Napoleon opposed state
borrowing on principle and imposed a rigid metallic currency, his
campaigns were bound to have a serious deflationary effect, and this was
indeed the deep cause of the economic crises of I8o5-o7 and I8II-I4· To
palliate likely internal discontent in I805 he set up an Extraordinary
marcin
(Marcin)
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