only eight millions had been unearthed. The remaining ten millions, in
bonds, bills, cash vouchers and mortgage documents were then smuggled
out of the country for the exiled Landgrave's use.
Napoleon put his foot down only when the personal corruption of his
acolytes put in jeopardy the Continental System. Bourrienne, as French
representative in Hamburg sold over I so,ooo authorizations for the
export of illegally imported goods between August I807 and December
I8Io, at rates of 0.25% and 0.5% the value of the merchandise. He made
more than one million francs from this scam, which meant that goods
worth between sixty and IZO millions were exported annually. It was
hardly surprising that colonial cotton, sugar and coffee continued to
circulate in Germany, Switzerland and Austria at prices lower than in
Paris, even after the decrees of I8Io. Recalled and fined for his corrupt
practices, and heedless of the fact that Napoleon had already pardoned
him once for embezzlement, the wretched Bourrienne complained of the
Emperor's 'ingratitude' and became a secret agent for the Bourbons.
Many commentators have remarked on Napoleon's hubris in embark
ing on the adventure in Spain at the very moment his Empire looked
rock-solid. Less attention has been lavished on the objective side of the
picture, which shows Napoleon launching into new and quixotic
adventures at the very moment the economic, demographic and
psychological factors hitherto favouring him were undergoing a reverse.
The ethos of the Grande Armee shifted from revolutionary virtue to
personal gain and advancement, producing a catastrophic decline in
morale and esprit de corps. After I807 the once magnificent army was
badly equipped, badly officered and frequently indisciplined. It became
increasingly obvious that most of the marshals were of poor military
calibre; Napoleon frequently rued the loss of the brilliant Desaix. The
reservoir of men was beginning to run dry, and after I8o7 the proportion
of battle losses was no longer so favourable to the French. The
inexperience and poor morale of conscripts after I 807 - at its simplest
level a result of having to fight in wars far from France which did not
seem to involve national interests - meant the army was not nearly so
potent a weapon as in I796-I8os; consequently manoeuvres under fire
became less plausible and therefore battle casualties greater.
Above all, the factor of money began to haunt the Emperor. An
examination of Napoleon's accounts fo r the period I October r8o6 to IS
October I8o8 shows a healthy state of affairs. Extraordinary taxes raised
3I r,66z,ooo francs, property taxes 79,667,000 francs and the fo reclosure
of coffers r6,qz,ooo. In addition, there was the huge war indemnity of
6oo million francs from Prussia, including the remounting of 40,ooo
marcin
(Marcin)
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