If the French did not occupy territory effectively, it fell into the hands of
partisans, leaving the French the task of 'cleansing' the area with
inadequate numbers and defective maps. They attacked regular troops
only when in overwhelming numbers and largely restricted themselves to
occupying areas evacuated by the enemy. But they struck terror into
French soldier and afrancesados alike. Known never to take prisoners,
they practised with gusto the arts of crucifixion, garrotting, boiling in oil
and burning at the stake. In addition to the luckless hundred thousand
French troops who died at their hands, another 30,0 00 Spaniards
suspected of collaboration were put to death in extremes of cruelty;
sometimes entire villages were wiped out.
The very geography of Spain favoured the partisans and worked
against the French. The principal mountain ranges - Pyrenees, Cantabri
ans, Guadarramas, the Sierra de Guadalupe, de Toledo and the Sierra
Morena - run east to west, as do the rivers Ebro, Douro, Tagus,
Guadiana, Guadalquivir; guerrilla movement was easier that way, but the
French needed good north-south communications to be supplied
effectively. In their mountain fastnesses the guerrilla leaders ruled bands
of warriors that could number anything from a fe w dozen to 8,ooo -as in
the case of Francisco Espoz y Mina. Active in Navarre and the most
famous of the guerrillas, Mina was an authoritarian peasant responsible
for many of the worst atrocities.
Other names that became familiar to French commanders were Juan
Pilarea, 'El Medico', who operated over a wide area from La Mancha to
Toledo and often menaced the environs of Madrid; Juan Diaz, 'El
Empecinado' ('the stubborn'), who was active in Castile (Aranda,
Segovia, Guadalajara) and boasted that he never lost a man in action; and
Juan Diaz Porlier, estimated to have commanded 4,000 men by 18II and
particularly associated with Galicia and the Asturias. Bloodthirsty,
ruthless and cruel men, they were, like sharks, not averse to devouring
each other if French victims were lacking; Mina fought a campaign in
1810 against another bandit leader, Echeverria. Haughty and indisci
plined, they disregarded any orders from the Cortes or the Junta or
Wellington that clashed with their own interests and were thus a perfect
analogue for Napoleon's marshals in Spain.
That the French held their own for so long, faced with a hostile
population and desperate enemies, was largely because they enjoyed the
support of local quislings or afrancesados. These pro-French collaborators
have divided historians as strongly as the guerrillas. Some view them as
naive idealists, who believed that collaboration with Joseph was the way
to preserve Spanish independence and annexation by Napoleon or who
marcin
(Marcin)
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