backs who come screaming to the bakeries.' But like many absolute rulers,
he found that economics was impervious to a dictator's wishes. The price
of bread in Paris continued to shoot up, first from 14 sous to 16 and
finally to 18 by March 1812 , and even at that price there were no loaves to
be had after the small hours of the morning. He tried to assuage anger by
fixing maximum prices for bread and corn but the result was what it
always is in such cases: the peasants responded by hoarding. Only in
Marseilles where the free play of the market was permitted was there no
bread shortage.
The situation was potentially explosive, but Paris did not after all rise
in revolt, possibly because there was no shortage even after the
'exploitative' price was paid, because the price of a loaf did not go above
zo sous, and because Napoleon palliated matters with soup kitchens. It
was a different story in the provinces, where there was either a shortage
of bread or the price was too high. The death-rate rose, hospitals and
charities were overwhelmed, and in some parts of France fully one-third
of the population survived only through the soup kitchens. The
consequences ranged from bread riots, beggary and Luddism to outright
brigandage; many of the brigands tried to legitimate their actions by
reference to the persecuted Catholic Church. There were serious riots in
Normandy, particularly centred on Caen, Lisieux and Cherbourg.
Emotions ran high and violent threats were uttered against notables,
bourgeoisie and upper peasantry, based on suspicions of hoarding. Since
these were the pillars of Napoleon's social support, he was forced to take
tough measures: he sent the Grand Army to Caen and had six
'ringleaders' executed, including two women.
The combination of draconian action and the good fortune of a
satisfactory crop turned the tide; by 1813, following a superb harvest, the
internal situation was reverting to normal; agricultural depression
returned to haunt the land only with the Emperor's military setbacks that
year. But 1810 definitely marked the parting of the ways between
Napoleon and his mainstay, the notables. Three black years dented
business confidence and, particularly after 1812, the bourgeoisie no
longer wanted to invest in the imperial enterprise that was showing
spectacular losses. There was always a latent contradiction between the
Emperor's military ambitions and the needs of his supporters in the social
power base. Capitalists were used to taking risks, but the gigantic gambles
of Napoleon's 'double or quits' military exploits were too much for them.
The peasants meanwhile got tired of supplying manpower for wars which
no longer had anything to do with guaranteeing the gains of 1789 but
were about the ambition of a single man.
marcin
(Marcin)
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