advance to the Orsha gap. Barclay did neither, mainly because he feared
Bagration was intriguing against him and would use any mistake he made
to discredit him. He advanced cautiously. The first clash of arms,
between the Cossacks and French cavalry, came at Inkovo to the north
west of Smolensk on 8 August. But when a further acrimonious clash of
personalities led Bagration to withdraw cooperation, Barclay panicked at
the thought of a possible ingenious Bonaparte counter-offensive and
pulled back again. Napoleon, who had been hoping to lure Barclay into a
trap, now opted for what he called the 'Smolensk manoeuvre': this
involved a strategic envelopment which would place several French army
corps in the enemy rear.
The Russians calculated that Napoleon would continue north of the
river Dnieper along the Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow road, bypassing the
city; he would cross the Dnieper only if he meant to attack Smolensk.
The Emperor did the unexpected and crossed the river on a I s-mile
front, using the unguarded bridge at Orsha and four pontoon bridges at
Rosasna. At first things went well. Murat and Ney swept aside the single
Russian division Barclay had stationed at Krasnoe, thirty miles from
Smolensk, and moved in on the city, confident of being able to get round
behind Barclay. By 14 August 17s,ooo French troops were south of the
river. The envelopment would have worked, but for Barclay's panicky
withdrawal, which once more took his forces out of range. The French
began to encounter stiffer resistance than expected. At the approaches to
the city the Russian defenders under Neveroski fought with ferocious
courage while Murat wasted an entire day trying to smash through their
lines with unsupported cavalry; but for this check the French would have
reached Smolensk on the evening of 14 August. When Napoleon heard of
Murat's failure, he ordered a 24-hour pause to regroup, losing the
element of surprise and allowing Barclay and Bagration to pull back
behind the defences of Smolensk.
The twenty-four hours should have given the Emperor pause for
serious thought. The Grande Armee was losing s-6,ooo men a day from
sickness and desertion; artillery horses had not been properly shod to deal
with conditions on the steppes, so that large numbers of cannon were
being left behind; the non-French troops were not performing well; the
whole force was ill-equipped and in the rush to press men into service,
large numbers of unfit men had been drafted. There was little versatility
in the ranks, and Napoleon lamented the shortage of his old 'jack of all
military trades' veterans. It now turned out that dragoons had been
hurriedly transformed into lancers but did not know how to use their
lances. The Army was down to 17_5,ooo effectives in the central group
marcin
(Marcin)
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