turned out to be much stronger than expected during the battle of
16--17th, the failure to cut the Moscow road initially and then the
dispatch of the wrong commander Ounot) on the 18th to cut off
Barclay's retreat.
But it seems that the week's delay in Smolensk was more a product of
complacency than genuine indecision for, if we may believe Murat, the
Emperor told him on the 17th that he was determined to pursue Barclay
to the gates of Moscow if necessary; for that reason Murat felt suicidal
and deliberately exposed himself to Russian shellfire that evening. If even
a hard-driving hothead like Murat baulked at the idea of an advance on
Moscow, it says much for the general mood in the French higher
command. On St Helena Napoleon conceded that pressing on from
Smolensk instead of wintering there was the greatest blunder of his life,
but insisted there was more rationality in the decision than he had been
credited with.
Time - and in Napoleon's mind it was always a question of time - was
against him and so, knowing the risks, he committed the Grande Armee to
a winter campaign for which it was unprepared. As he saw it, the pluses
outnumbered the minuses. Russian morale was bound to grow with the
propaganda advantage of an 'undefeated' army so that by 1813 they
would be both materially and psychologically stronger while the French
grew weaker; a six-month delay would enable Alexander to draw in his
Moldavian and Finnish allies and press more men from the back country,
to say nothing of the aid he might get from Britain. The canard that
Napoleon had been halted in his tracks would give fresh heart to the
Prussians and Austrians and might even persuade them to switch sides in
the next campaigning season. An early offensive in 1813 against the
overstretched French front would be 1807 all over again - and Napoleon
had not forgotten Eylau.
On the other hand, Moscow was only 270 miles ahead, its inhabitants
would panic if he advanced and, if the Czar would not fight for
Smolensk, he would surely fight for Moscow. Napoleon still sought the
decisive military victory that would bring Russia to the peace table, and
his prestige and credibility demanded that he advance on Moscow;
otherwise it could be said he had overreached himself and fallen short of
his aims. But the overriding reason for Napoleon's decision was political
rather than military. Aware of the depth of opposition to him in Paris, he
could not afford to stay away for more than a year. So it was that the
political tail, salted by the notables, wagged the military dog on the
Russian front.
And so it was that Murat, Caulaincourt and all his marshals, with the
single exception of Davout, urged him in vain to winter in Smolensk.
marcin
(Marcin)
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