remain in Moscow for six months; seek a second battle with Kutusov and
then continue south to the pleasanter weather and richer landscape of
Kiev and the Ukraine; or retreat to Smolensk prior to an advance on St
Petersburg in the spring of 1813.
The second option, seeking a second battle and marching to Kiev,
appealed to Napoleon, who was reluctant to retreat without winning a
decisive victory over Kutusov. But the sheer volume of military, logistical
and commissariat problems envisaged told against it in an army that
could barely keep open its lines of communication with Smolensk. But
Napoleon was unhappy about the prospect of a perilous so-day retreat to
the Niemen; contemplating his losses in the supposedly 'easy' season of
summer, how could he view the prospect of a winter trek with
equanimity? As Caulaincourt pointed out, the Grand Army lacked
everything necessary to combat the winter: sheepskins, stout fur-lined
gloves, caps with ear-flaps, warm boot-socks, heavy boots to protect the
feet against frostbite; frost nails fo r the horses' hooves. On the face of it,
then, there seemed much to be said for the idea of remaining in Moscow,
especially since there was enough fo od in the city to feed the army for six
months.
But Napoleon was still uneasy. It was true that his troops in Moscow
had plenty of food, but if he tried to maintain the military status quo in
Russia, his other far-flung units would starve. Kutusov would grow in
numbers, resources and confidence all winter; what if the Grande Armee
was beset by sickness, so that its numbers dwindled even fu rther? There
was assuredly no hope of reinforcements from the west until next spring,
and what would happen if Kutusov launched another winter campaign, as
the Russians had in 18o6-o7? The memory of the slaughter at Eylau,
conflated with the recent bloodbath at Borodino, was enough to deter
even the most reckless gambler. Yet possibly even more important than
these weighty considerations, was the old political imperative: Napoleon
could not afford to be away from Paris so long.
At last the Emperor ended his vacillation and, on 17 October, ordered
that the retreat to the Niemen should begin two days later. Then came
news of a near disaster to Murat's advance guard at Vinkovo. After three
weeks of shadowboxing with the Cossacks, and becoming used to the
presence of Kutusov's advance guard just an hour's march away, Murat
grew careless. Kutusov, meanwhile, under intense pressure to take action
instead of, as he advised, waiting for 'General Winter' to finish off the
French, suddenly launched a surprise attack. Inflicting z,soo casualties
the Russian offensive came close to annihilating Murat who, however,
managed to turn the tide at the eleventh hour. Furious with Murat for
marcin
(Marcin)
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