Napoleon's idea was to fight a holding action in the north, using III,
IV, VI and VII Corps, while the garrison troops of Leipzig secured the
western routes to Lindenau. The decisive action would be in the east,
with II, V, VIII and XI Corps; IX Corps and the Guard would be in
reserve. The Allies initially planned to loop round through the marshes to
the south but were intercepted by the French, so that the main battle
took place in the south-east. Napoleon did not expect much fighting in
the north and west, so was caught off balance when it happened. His
inadequate preparations to deal with this contingency can be realized
from two salient facts: he was utterly complacent about the west and had
built no additional brid ges across the river from Leipzig to Lindenau; and
he was so confident that fighting in the north would be sporadic that he
weakened the sector by withdrawing part of Marmont's VI Corps to the
south.
When contact with the enemy was finally made and the Emperor
realized his error, he drew up the bulk of his army south-east of Leipzig,
planning to pin Schwarzenberg and the Allied centre while Augereau and
IX Corps enveloped the right; Marmont and the others were to hold
Blucher at bay in the north. But the Battle of Leipzig, which began at
6.30 on the morning of I6 October, soon became a murderous slugging
match, a bloodbath of pure attrition which reached a peak between 9 and
I I a.m. On Napoleon's chosen terrain the Austrian attack was badly
coordinated and a well-drilled defence could have annihilated it. Instead
the French defenders fe ll into confusion, allowing the Austrians to press
on, all the while taking dreadful punishment from 700 well-sited French
guns. By mid-morning it was clear that the Allied offensive against the
French centre had failed.
At this crucial moment Napoleon dithered. Not wanting to order
Augereau's flanking movement until he was certain that Marmont had
not been overwhelmed by Blucher, he opted instead for softening up the
Austrian centre by wheeling up ISO guns and pounding them for an hour.
At midday he launched his counterattack in the main sector; initially this
went well, and the prospect of victory loomed. At 2 p.m. he decided to go
for the knock-out punch, and for half an hour there followed the most
vicious fighting any of the French veterans could remember. At 2.30 p.m.
Murat and his IO,ooo cavalry went into action. Thinking all was secure in
the centre, Napoleon turned his attention to the north.
Here Marmont and VI Corps had been involved in fighting that was, if
anything, even more sanguinary than the engagement in the south-east.
Marmont's captaincy that day was inspired and he almost achieved a
miracle like Davout's at Auerstadt against the Prussians. Two things
marcin
(Marcin)
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