new allies the Austrians. The marshals now had no option but to return
to the Emperor with the bad news and ask for his unconditional
abdication. On 6 April Napoleon signed the deed, and on the very same
day Talleyrand nudged the Senate towards his final goal: the restoration
of the Bourbons.
Three things strike the Bonaparte student as salient about the dramatic
first three months of 1814. First is the brilliance of Napoleon's
campaigning. Second is the astonishing level of treachery towards the
Emperor. Third is the affectionate relationship between Napoleon and
Marie-Louise. Of these the first largely speaks for itself. As Wellington
commented later after a close examination of the northern campaign:
'The study of it has given me a greater idea of his genius than any other.
Had he continued that system a little while longer it is my opinion that he
would have saved Paris.' On the second, the only surprise is that the
dreadful Talleyrand still finds his supporters. Even the great Pieter Geyl
displayed naivete in thinking Talleyrand had the interests of France at
heart, rather than his own, in 1814. Talleyrand's apologists appear to
work from a false syllogism: Napoleon's interests and those of France
were different; Talleyrand's interests and Napoleon's were different;
therefore Talleyrand's interests and those of France were identical.
Marie-Louise's conduct and support for her husband during these
trying three months were irreproachable. She was the only one on the
Council of Regency who fu lly supported the Emperor and was
continually thwarted by Joseph and Talleyrand. Despite the danger that
the Paris mob, enraged by the Allied siege, might in exasperation visit on
her the fate it had meted out to Marie-Antoinette, she wanted to stay and
fight and was overborne only when Joseph produced a letter from
Napoleon written on 8 February. This contained the following: 'Ifl lose a
battle ... get the Empress and the King of Rome to leave for Rambouillet
... Never let the Empress and the King of Rome fall into the hands of
the enemy... I would prefer my son to be killed rather than see him
brought up in Vienna as an Austrian prince.'
Marie-Louise made it plain in a letter to Napoleon on 29 March that
she thought this was bad advice:
They insist on my going ... I should have been quite brave enough to
stay, and I am very angry that they would not let me, especially when
the Parisians are showing such eagerness to defend themselves ... But
the whole lot of them have lost their heads except me, and I believe that
in a day or two you will tell me I was right in not wanting to evacuate
the capital for a mere IS,OOO cavalrymen who would never have got