that evening by a Prussian counterattack. Rain was already falling heavily
and darkness coming down fast when the Guard finally went into action
and cut a swathe through the Prussians. At 8 p.m. Blucher's counter
attack with cavalry was easily beaten off. Napoleon had smashed the
Prussian centre but the two wings got away intact under cover of
darkness. If Napoleon had had two more hours of darkness, or if
d'Erlon's corps had not been withdrawn, he would have won a total
victory even without Ney. This would have doomed Wellington and
possibly even swung the balance of the entire war in Napoleon's favour.
As it was, he had sustained IZ,ooo casualties and caused Prussian losses of
16,ooo men and 21 guns; there were also 9,ooo Prussian deserters.
Blucher himself was thrown off his horse and narrowly escaped being
trampled to death by French cuirassiers.
Qu atre Bras and Ligny should have taught Napoleon that he could
never win while he used Soult and Ney as his chief agents. Ney's timidity
on the 15th, his inactivity on the morning of the 16th, his inability to
grasp the overall strategy at Ligny and his recall of d'Erlon were matched
only by the impenetrability of Soult's orders and the incompetence of his
staffwork. But the ultimate responsibility for appointing both these men
rests with Napoleon - they were far fr om being the only senior
individuals available. Perhaps Napoleon knew in his heart that the game
was already up, for he went down with incapacitating illness, did not
order a pursuit of the Prussians and so lost contact with them, with
ultimately disastrous results. Medical historians of Napoleon claim that
he was suffering from acromegaly - a disease of the pituitary gland
among whose symptoms are tiredness and overoptimism - but a more
likely diagnosis is a psychogenic reaction to excessive stress and extreme
fr ustration.
Napoleon still expressed himself confident of total victory next day,
since two corps (d'Erlon's and Lobau's) had not been in battle at all while
the Guard had suffered only light casualties. But on the 17th, still
suffering from a heavy cold and bladder problems, he fell back into
lethargy. Nothing excuses the fact that he issued no orders until noon,
thus losing the advantage he had gained by Ligny. Some military
historians go further and claim that the twelve hours between 9 p.m. on
the 16th and 9 a.m. on th� 17th were the critical period when the Belgian
campaign was lost. Ney, too, was his usual incompetent self. It is clear in
retrospect that if Ney had attacked Wellington at Qu atre Bras on the
morning of the 17th he could have pinned him there while Napoleon
moved round the exposed flank on the Anglo-Dutch left, where the
Prussian withdrawal had left them vulnerable.
marcin
(Marcin)
#1