Visit bit.ly/2dC85K1 for a larger version of this table.Adiaphora (ἀδιάφορα): indifferent things; neither good nor bad in an absolute moral sense. In Stoic thought, all things outside our
sphere of reasoned choice (see prohairesis) are indifferent. In a relative sense, some of the things outside our control are preferred or
dispreferred goods (proêgmena/aproêgmena). Marcus says (5.20) that people who thwart the progress of our reasoned choice, although
normally our natural concern, also become indifferent to us. The term appears in Epictetus’s Discourses seventeen times and once in
Enchiridion; see Discourses 2.19.12b–13 and 3.3.1. In Marcus it appears six times; see also 8.56 (my prohairesis is indifferent to that of
others, and vice versa).
Agathos (ἀγαθός): good, or a proper object of desire. Epictetus upholds the classic Stoic position when he says that the good (and evil)
are only to be found in us, in our prohairesis, not in external things (Discourses 2.16.1), and when he says, “God laid down this law, saying: if
you want some good, get it from yourself” (1.29.4). “Protect your own good in all that you do” (4.3.11).
Anthrôpos (ἄνθρωπος): a human being, human beings in general. For Epictetus (Discourses 2.10.1), above all we are human beings
whose power of reasoned choice (prohairesis) supervises all and is completely free. A “beautiful human being” possesses the virtues
(Discourses 3.1.6b–9). We must be a “unified human being” (Discourses 3.15.13), what Hadot calls self-coherence (The Inner Citadel, pp.
130–31). In Marcus (see 5.1, 5.20, 8.1, 8.5, 8.26), the term is used in conjunction with an emphasis on what our proper concern and work
should be.