of conclusive evidence that Iraq, in fact, still had
such weapons. Weapons inspections and intel-
ligence assessments conducted before and after
the war have shown that most, if not all, of Iraq’s
arsenal of lethal weapons had been destroyed or
significantly degraded since the mid-1990s as a
result of the UN inspections.
Alternatively, the Bush administration argued
that the replacement of Husayn’s government by
a democratic government would help spread the
cause of freedom in the region, provide its people
with greater security, and help resolve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Consequently, the invasion was
called Operation Iraqi Freedom. On a more practi-
cal level, having a friendly government in Baghdad
that allowed American troops to be stationed in the
country would assure U.S. control of the world’s
oil supply at a time of growing demand by newly
industrializing nations, especially china and india.
Iraq has the fourth-largest proven oil reserves in the
world and a strategically dominant location vis-à-
vis other oil-producing nations in the Middle East.
The third Gulf War has had a significant
impact on the dynamics of Islamic politics and
radicalism in the early 21st century. Above all,
it has brought Shii Muslims into power where
there had previously been a secular Arab regime
consisting mostly of Sunnis. Instead of the Baath
Party, the dominant parties in the government now
are the Daawa Party and the Supreme Council of
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (renamed Supreme
Islamic Iraqi Council in May 2007), both of which
are Islamic organizations that had been opposed
to Saddam Husayn’s regime and had received
protection, support, and training from the revo-
lutionary Shii government in Iran. In addition,
two Shii religious figures have risen to national
prominence in the country—the venerable Ayatol-
lah Ali Sistani (b. 1930), an expert in the sharia,
and Muqtada al-Sadr (b. 1973), who comes from
a prominent family of Shii religious authorities
and controls a Shii militia. Despite U.S. military
presence in the country, the war has also given
Iran the opportunity to influence Iraqi affairs in a
way that it has not been able to do since the days
of the saFavid dynasty in the 17th century, when
it was part of the Safavid Empire. Leaders of Saudi
Arabia and Jordan, meanwhile, have expressed
concern that the war has allowed the Shia to exer-
cise more influence throughout the Middle East,
from lebanon to the Persian Gulf, creating what
some observers have called a “Shii Crescent.”
At the same time, radical Sunni Muslim orga-
nizations, led by al-qaida, have declared a jihad
on U.S. and British troops in Iraq, using the
foreign occupation of a Muslim country in their
propaganda to win new recruits. In addition to
attacking U.S. and British troops, they have also
been held responsible for killing Shii civilians in
suicide bombings and assassinations. Inspired by
Wahhabism, they regard Shiism as a form of unbe-
lief and oppose the cooperation of Shii officials in
the Iraqi government with U.S. authorities. Their
actions have contributed significantly to sectarian
violence between Iraqi Shiis and Sunnis. Radical
Islamic groups and overt Shii-Sunni sectarian vio-
lence were not present in Iraq when it was under
Baath control prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Experts have expressed concern that these forces
may further destabilize the entire region and put
the world’s oil supply in jeopardy.
See also daaWa party oF iraq; gUlF states;
islamism.Further reading: George Packer, Assassin’s Gate: Amer-
ica in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux,
2005); James Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalisms
and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago: The Fundamentalism Proj-
ect, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991);
Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the
Shadow of America’s War (New York: Henry Holt, 2005);
Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Iraq War
Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2003).Gulf Wars 277 J