local community and the attitudes of the rulers.
For example, it is estimated that in the early 19th
century, the north Indian city of Lucknow had as
many as 8,000 Husayniyyas and takiyas under its
pro-Shii rulers, the Nawwabs, while the region
of Khorasan in Iran today has some 2,000 such
structures. Sunni Wahhabis, on the other hand,
destroyed Husayniyyas in the past and strictly
control their proliferation in the Eastern Province
of saUdi arabia today. Shii immigrant communi-
ties living in North America and Europe have
built their own Husayniyyas.
The ritual practices conducted at the Husayni-
yya have varied, often depending on local commu-
nity custom. Generally, they are governed by what
one scholar has called the “Karbala paradigm,”
which involves the commemoration of events sur-
rounding the martyrdom of Husayn and his loyal
followers. Rituals include long, moving recitations
of elegiac poems (sing. marthiyya) that employ
themes of divine justice and worldly injustice,
death, and suffering. Such recitations often pro-
voke outbursts of weeping among participants.
The Husayniyya, often decorated with banners,
religious portraiture, emblems, and Karbala mod-
els, is where ritual objects used in Ashura proces-
sions are stored, and affiliated members organize
the Ashura processions and related ritual perfor-
mances. In many communities, participants in
Husayniyya rituals beat their chests in rhythmic
unison or afflict their bodies by self-flagellation,
which can induce copious bleeding—a demon-
stration of one’s piety, devotion, manliness, and
atonement for one’s sins. Theatrical reenactments,
including musical performances and costumed
actors, of moments in Shii sacred history, culmi-
nating with Husayn’s death, are staged at Husayni-
yyas and takiyas in Iran. Husayniyyas are also
where people gather for prayer, other religious
holidays, and funerals.
Traditionally, Husayniyyas have been reli-
gious places for men, while Women have con-
ducted their Ashura rites at home, although they
also watch and participate in public processions.
In recent years, women in some countries have
established their own Husayniyyas, using them
as centers of edUcation and political activity,
as has happened in Bahraini matams in recent
years. The modern transformation of Husayni-
yyas into political focal points occurred in Iran
in the 1960s and 1970s, when Iranians became
actively involved in antigovernment activities
that eventually led to the iranian revolUtion
oF 1978–1979. The most famous example is the
Husayniyya-i Irashad, founded in 1965 in the
Iranian capital, Tehran. It had male and female
members and offered films and a forum for the
expression of new religious and political ideas.
It engaged Ulama and laity alike and featured
the lectures of ali shariati (d. 1977), whose
revolutionary talks rallied people against the
government.
See also shiism; Wahhabism.Further reading: Kamran Scot Aghaie, ed., The Women
of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses
in Modern Shii Islam (Austin: University of Texas Press,
2005); Juan R. I. Cole, Roots of North Indian Shiism in
Iran and Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722–1859
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Vernon
James Schubel, “Karbala as Sacred Space among North
American Shia: ‘Every Day Is Ashura, Everywhere Is
Karbala.’ ” In Making Muslim Space in North America and
Europe, edited by Barbara Metcalf, 186–203 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996).hypocrites
A hypocrite is someone whose actions contradict
his or her outwardly stated beliefs or values. In
early Islamic history, the “hypocrites” (Arabic
munafiqun, fem. munafiqat), also called “dissem-
blers” and “dissenters,” were originally Mus-
lims in medina who opposed or disagreed with
mUhammad. In other words, they were regarded as
a disloyal faction within the Muslim community.
According to Ibn Ishaq’s eighth-century biography
of Muhammad, the Sira, they were mostly fromhypocrites 321 J