GOVERNMENT,MARKET AND COMMUNITY IN URBAN SOLID WASTE 261
a major reason behind its success. Strict supervision by residential welfare associa-
tions has strongly contributed to the success of the scheme. Although involvement of
CBOs could be observed in all classes of areas, including slums, their work seems to
have the most effect in middle and high-income districts.
In Nairobi the impact of CBOs on SWC is smaller. In the slums CBOs (often with the
support of NGOs) endeavour to compensate for the failure of the NCC and the
apparent inability or unwillingness of the private sector to extend services to these
areas. The (local) government keeps aloof from these CBOs and only provides some
moral support by actively participating in their environmental clean-up campaigns. In
general CBO-local authority relationships are either non-existent or antagonistic.
Such residential welfare associations are increasingly challenging the NCC for its
mismanagement and lack of accountability.
Solid waste collection: outcomes
The second research question looks at the contributions of various actors in SWC (on
their own or through a partnership) to the goals of urban sustainable development. As
the organisation of SWC in both cities differs, one can expect to find variations in
terms of socio-economic impacts. A first remarkable observation is that actors in both
cities have opted for using labour-intensive and technologically simple modes of SWC
(largely working with open vehicles without mechanical lifting devices, manual
sweeping), whereas many (top-down and large-scale) privatisation exercises in the
developing world stimulated by international agencies (e.g. World Bank) have been
based on the application of sophisticated, labour-saving technologies (compaction
trucks, multi-lift containers). The methods applied in Nairobi and Hyderabad are both
cheap and well adapted to prevailing physical circumstances and have the additional
advantage that they allow for integration of small-scale enterprises that do not have
large capital assets.
Despite the fact that choices of technology seem to fit local conditions, however, the
profitability of its usage in practice cannot be taken for granted. The Nairobi case
showed that the economic viability of privatised SWC is seriously impaired, as
companies are engaged in a process of open and uncoordinated competition to cater
for the needs of scattered clients. There is no legal backing or official support to grant
providers exclusive rights to the service in a particular area and to require residents to
participate in the service. In the SWM literature this is usually considered a prerequi-
site for cost-effective servicing. In Nairobi there were quite a number of so-called
‘briefcase’ companies offering collection services to residents in low-income sections
of the city at extremely low fees but without any guarantee of regularity due to the
deplorable state of their vehicles. In Hyderabad, in contrast, the economic viability of
privatised SWC is more or less ensured as a result of detailed specifications in the
service contracts designed by the MCH, including a 10 percent net benefit for the