32 JOHAN POST
officials with a traditional ‘law and order’ mentality also explains why the idea of
wider participation of informal actors and community-based organisations in service
delivery has not yet moved far beyond the stage of experiments (ibid: 497).
To a certain extent the deeply entrenched belief that the state should manage and
control all public affairs could also prove beneficial as the success of privatisation,
according to many commentators, depends on the local government providing an
appropriate framework. However, this requires that local authorities have the financial
means and administrative capacities to act accordingly. In actual fact the devolution
of functional and financial power to local bodies in accordance with the
Seventy-Fourth Constitutional Amendment 1992 is still being implemented. Critics
claim, for example, that gains have been made in terms of ‘democratic’ improvements
in the organisation of local administrative units which, however, are not commensu-
rate with a clearly mandated functional agenda that will enable them to function as
units of self-government (Sundaram, 2000; Sivaramakrishnan, 2000). Of course
decentralisation is a formidable undertaking that will not produce immediate success.
An important obstacle relates to the continued dependence of local bodies on funding
by the Central and State governments. Decisions on the division of fiscal resources
between the State governments and the municipality are somewhat arbitrary and few
attempts have been made to match funds and functions (most important revenues
continued flowing to the States). In actual fact a wide variety in approaches exists
between different States, which may partly be attributed to their uniqueness but also
attests to the lack of guidance at the national level (Sivaramakrishnan, 2000). Further-
more, most local bodies still have insufficient human and institutional capacity to
perform their new functions, especially the smaller ones (Sundaram, 2000: 295). The
weakness of the local tax imposition and collection system seriously hampers greater
autonomy. Finally, many functions that are within the purview of local bodies are still
carried out by State governments, leading to confusion and conflicts of competence
(Mathur, 1996 and 1998; Singh, 1996). This is especially troublesome in the large
metropolitan areas – Hyderabad being one of these – with metropolitan corporations
and municipalities zealously defending their respective domains, while the State or
Central governments residing in these mega cities simultaneously seek to exercise
control (Sivaramakrishnan, 2000).
The imperfections of the decentralisation exercise also trouble solid waste manage-
ment. Municipalities depend on regional or central state levels to cover investments in
landfill sites, composting enterprises or incineration plants, at the expense of their own
discretionary power. They may have to call upon the State government to ensure
payment of private contractors collecting municipal solid waste. This introduces polit-
ical elements in the negotiations beyond the domain of local politics and hinders
long-term planning and efficient service provision (Ali et al., 1999). Furthermore, the
idea of close supervision inherent in contracting out public services requires the
concerted efforts and close collaboration of contract managers, performance monitors,