34 JOHAN POST
to implement reforms that threaten to undercut existing privileges. The lack of
commitment to the idea of scaling down direct involvement of the state in commercial
undertakings and service delivery, which are among the stated goals of the Kenya’s
National Development Plan, is a case in point (Aseto and Okello, 1997). The relation-
ships between the Kenyan state and civil society are tense and characterised by
distrust. NGOs and people’s organisations have increasingly supplemented the
declining state support for basic services since the 1980s. However, the state views
this development with unease and has attempted to control these bodies from above
and subjected them to the system of political patronage (Kanyinga, 1995).
As far as solid waste collection is concerned most local governments do not have
official policies towards the privatisation of these services and actual support to the
idea is largely confined to an occasional experiment (UNCHS, 1998). Nevertheless,
numerous small and large firms have sprung up trying to fill the gap left by the dismal
performance of most public cleansing departments. They are attending to the needs of
the upper and middle-income groups who can afford to pay commercial prices
(Werna, 1998). However, this spontaneous privatisation takes place without any insti-
tutional or legal regulation. Similarly, waste disposal in low-income areas, especially
slums and squatter areas, largely depends on voluntary efforts to burn it or bring it to
the nearest formal collection point.
The apparent indifference of local governments towards the service needs of their
(poor) inhabitants partly relates to their subordinate and feeble position in the admin-
istrative system. Kenya is among a steadily declining group of countries in the devel-
oping world that have not yet seriously embarked on the road towards devolution.
Most decisions of local councils still require ministerial permission. Furthermore, the
discretionary power of local authorities is seriously compromised by the constant
interference of the provincial administration working through state appointed district
commissioners, district officers and chiefs that are primarily loyal to the president and
the party. With respect to local finance there is still no system of central grants or
revenue sharing in Kenya, which is exceptional from an international perspective. For
their budget local authorities rely almost exclusively on land rates, service charges and
license fees. However, financial management and resource mobilisation are notori-
ously weak. Most municipal councils suffer from lack of discipline in financial
accountability, nepotism and patronage in recruitment practices, dishonesty of
revenue collectors, political pressures on officers to be less aggressive in revenue
collection, and high turnover of staff (Gatheru and Shaw, 1998: 142-4; Lewis, 1998:
145). Many of these problems are officially recognised and have made the government
embark on a programme of Local Government Reform based on increased devolution.
The policy pronouncements, however, still have to be matched with action on the
ground.