In Akan conceptions, each person is unique
because each soul is unique. Ontologically, then, the
individual person must be self-complete in terms of
his or her essence because it requires nothing but
itself to exist (except for the fact the he or she was
held as created by divinity). If this is so, it cannot be
the case that the reality of the person is derivative
and posterior to that of the community. Therefore,
it would not be correct to maintain that the notion
of personhood is conferred by the community, nor
would it be correct to assert that the definition of
personhood is a function of the community.
The pronounitdoes not exist in the Akan lan-
guage for animate things. Thus, “he is in the room”
is translated in Akan asowo dan no mu, “she is in
the room” asowo dan no mu, and “it (referring
to a cat) is in the room” also asowo dan no mu.
However, it exists for inanimate things. Thus, the
answer to the question “Where is the book?” will
beewo dan no mu, that is, “It is in the room.”
Because the Akan pronounoapplies to all three
genders (strictly only to a part of the neuter gender,
however), it would follow that the answer to the
question “Where is the old man?” (if we want to
use a pronoun) will beowo dan no mu, that is,
“he/it is in the room.” Clearly, then, the neuter
pronoun in the Akan language for animate things
makes no commitment to the ontological status of
its designatum. A child or baby will be as much a
person as an adult or a grey-haired old man. The
argument thatit, used of children (in the English
language), implies that they are not yet persons
therefore collapses, for the Akan “it” (=o), as we
have observed, is used also of adults and older
people. In English, one could say of the baby, “It is
a beautiful baby,” but never of a older woman,
“It is a beautiful woman.” Are those older people
persons or are they yet to acquire their personhood
after it has been conferred by community?
Some have argued that, because children who die
get simpler funerals than adults, it shows that com-
munity must confer personhood. But it is not true
that every older person who dies in an African com-
munity is given an elaborate burial. The type of bur-
ial and the nature and extent of grief expressed over
the death of an older person depend on the commu-
nity’s assessment, not of his or her personhood as
such, but of the dead person’s achievements in life,
his or her contribution to the welfare of the commu-
nity, and the respect he or she commanded in the
community. Older persons who may not satisfy such
criteria may, in fact, be given simple and poor funer-
als and attenuated forms of grief expressions. As to
the absence of ritualized grief on the death of a child,
this has no connection whatsoever with the African
view of personhood as such, but stems rather from
beliefs about the possible consequences for the
mother of the dead child of showing excessive grief.
One belief among the Akan people is that excessive
demonstration of grief will make the mother infertile
because it will make her reach her menopause pre-
maturely; another belief is that the excessive show of
grief over the death of a child will drive the dead
child too far away for it to reincarnate, and so on.
A human person is a person whatever his or her
age or social status. Personhood is thus not
acquired or yet to be achieved as one goes along
in society. What a person acquires are habits
and character traits: he or she, qua person, thus
becomes the subject of the acquisition and is not
fully defined by what he or she acquires. One is a
person because of what he or she is, not because
of what he or she has done or acquired.
We also know for a fact that children not only
should have rights, but that they do have rights
in African society. Let us once again refer to the
Akan phrase: “All persons are children of divinity;
no one is a child of the earth.” Note that this
statement makes no distinction between younger
and older persons; it speaks of all persons; it does
not suggest either that babies or younger people
are not children of divinity. Second, this phrase
has ethical overtones because there must be some-
thing intrinsically valuable in divinity for the insis-
tent claim to be made that everyone is divinity’s
child. A person, inasmuch as he or she is a child of
divinity, must also be thought of as having intrin-
sic worth and should be accorded dignity, respect,
and importance. From this it can be inferred that
a person has moral rights that are anterior to the
community—rights that are therefore not con-
ferred by society, but are concomitant to the
notion of personhood. Children have rights
because, like adults, they are persons.Nature of Community
Let us turn to the nature of community. A human
community is, of course, a community or a group
of persons who are linked by interpersonal bonds,Personhood 523