Most elite theorists have been unimpressed with the likelihood of real
political change, since they see elites as holding all the best cards in
the political game. Political stability is achieved by elites through
ideological dominance (Mosca’s political ‘myths’) and the superior
organisation of a smaller group with greater economic resources and
social prestige. However both Pareto and Mosca see the possibility of
cycles of apparent change which may result in a change in the
personnel of government but not in the fundamental fact of elite
dominance. Thus Pareto describes cycles in which ‘Lions’ who rule
largely by force are succeeded by ‘Foxes’ who attempt to rule by guile
and deception. Mosca describes the possibility of popular leaders
taking power in the name of democracy – but sees this process as a
deception, since the new leadership will inevitably rule in its own
interest.
Classic Marxist writers (including Marx, Engels and Lenin) saw
key political changes as occurring through violent revolutions in
which discrepancies between the political system and the underlying
social and economic class system were resolved (see chapters 1 and 4).
These discrepancies were the result of longer-term gradual changes in
the relations of production brought about by changes in technology
and trading patterns.
Pluralist writers have tended to emphasise the possibility of
gradual change in response to a host of factors allowing the con-
tinuance of stable government through negotiated compromises
between groups. Thus Allardt and Littunen (1964) argue that the
most stable political situation is where many social divisions overlap
and different groups go into political coalitions for different purposes.
All groups feel that they can influence the situation and thus remain
committed to the system, and are forced to stress those aspects on
which they agree in order to build co-operation with others. The
premium on bargaining in such situations means that as new
developments arise, piecemeal adjustments to them can be made, and
stability maintained.
Such a situation of healthy co-operation, competition and bargain-
ing must be distinguished from the sort of situation characteristic
of, say, the French Fourth Republic in which a kaleidoscopic variety
of forces fail to agree on an effective government. In this case
governments succeeded each other on average every eight months
(Williams, 1964).
PROCESSES 119