(i) unambiguous signal of required behaviour must reach local imple-
menter and be understood;
(ii) either (a) they must want to conform to new policy and have power
to implement it, or (b) costs of non-implementation must be made
to clearly exceed benefits of inertia.
Managing local public policy
It may be helpful to expand upon the previous section by looking
briefly at the implementation of public policy from the point of the
local managers of such a service. This may help to add a realistic
perspective to the problems of implementing policy prescriptions.
Although such managers are in very varied circumstances we can
point to some likely common characteristics: they are in a multiple
series of bargaining relationships as suggested by the diagram in
Figure 8.2; they have limited time and information sources, many
tasks and limited resources.
A minor example of this would be one of the author’s research on
the Youth Training Scheme (Tansey, 1989) in which training officers
within organisations were seen as having to negotiate with:
personnel and finance directors for permission to run/finance the
scheme;
departmental heads to offer worthwhile placements for trainees;
Manpower Service Commission (a QUANGO) representatives to
approve the scheme;
Careers Service (local government) officials to publicise and recruit for
the scheme;
technical college course tutors on the content of off-the-job training;
industrial training boards (more QUANGOs) on the acceptability of the
training for apprenticeship purposes;
the trainees themselves in respect of their behaviour;
and so on.
Some major variables which may affect managers’ capacity to take an
independent view of how policy should be implemented will include
their relationship to, and distance from, clients, their relationship to
local authorities/central departments, and the degree of their depen-
dence on firms/voluntary organisations, etc. for resources.
228 POLICIES