By way of a heroic simplification which may help to get an initial
grasp of the differences at stake, we may adopt Berlin’s terminology
of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ concepts of freedom (Berlin, 1958). Berlin
himself went on to elaborate four concepts of freedom (Berlin, 1969).
The ‘negative’ view is that of the classic English writers that ‘I am
normally said to be free to the degree to which no human being
interferes with my activity’ (Berlin, 1958: 7). The positive view is one
which defines freedom as ‘being one’s own master’ (Berlin, 1958: 16).
To put the matter more baldly, negative freedom is freedom from,
whilst positive freedom is freedom to.
At first sight such distinctions appear trivial and unimportant.
However, one important consequence of the positive view may be
that paradoxically it may be used to argue that, as Rousseau (1913:
15) puts it, one can be ‘forced to be free’.
If one is forced to obey a morally justified law that conflicts with
one’s immediate inclinations – ‘the impulse of appetite’ – then one’s
‘real’ self is said to be realised. Conversely opponents of the ‘nega-
tive’ view of freedom would argue that those legal freedoms of
speech, assembly, equality before the law and so on are of little bene-
fit to Indian peasants with insufficient means to maintain themselves.
Analysing political concepts
Our discussion of political ideas in this chapter has illustrated that
political terms which may be taken for granted in everyday
conversation or argument conceal depths of meaning and room for
divergent interpretations which have led to centuries of argument. It
is clear that there is a need in academic and everyday discussion to
clarify the way in which a term is intended if it is to be understood.
Plato saw philosophical enquiry as essentially about discovering the
CONCEPTS 65
control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on
knowledge of natural necessity.
(Engels, Anti-Duhring, Ch. XI)
(From Cranston, 1954: 8, 12, 23–24)