contending identities’’ (Connolly 1995 , xvii). Connolly’s ethos is crucial to a
viable process of engagement across diVerence.
There are, however, pluralist critics of such imaginative dreams of agon-
ism. Connolly claims that an agonistic model of pluralist and democratic
engagement could foster greater inclusion of diverse citizens and more
mutual respect; Honig also thinks agonism can disrupt hegemonic political
ideas and spaces. Deveaux ( 1999 ) thinks not, and argues that the claim that
agonism ‘‘could more readily foster the inclusion of citizens’ moral, cultural,
and ethical diVerences is simply unfounded’’ ( 1999 , 3 ). Agonism, on the
contrary, could lead to the entrenchment of existing identities and ‘‘make it
more diYcult for diverse cultural communities to see that they do share at
least some social and moral views, norms and interests in common with
others’’ ( 1999 , 15 ). Likewise, Raz ( 1986 , 401 ) notes that ‘‘pluralism has an
inherent tendency to generate intolerance, a tendency which ought to be
guarded against.’’ It is not just agonism that comes out of pluralism, but the
very real danger of intolerance.
The political fact is that such intolerant agonism is already entrenched,
especially in American politics, without the lubricants of critical responsive-
ness, recognition, and respect for the positions of others. Such agonism,
unattached to any formal or informal institutions of engagement, is certainly
laced with the vile and disrespect Deveaux fears, rather than the optimistic
vision of Connolly. Deveaux ( 1999 , 16 ) argues that ‘‘proponents of agonistic
democracy typically fail to acknowledge the key role played byinstitutionsin
makingcitizensagree,orinWnding solutions to common problems.’’ While
there seems to be agreement among agonists on the value of engagement and
conXict itself, Deveaux argues that some liberals, and certainly those focused
on forms of deliberative democracy, are better in terms of giving that agonism
somewhere to play out. We should, she argues, focus on developing speciWc
political practices which will facilitate the expression and engagement of
citizens’ disagreements.
The issue here is the move from the theoretical argument regarding
the fact and ethos of pluralism to the much more practical and political
issue of how to bring that existing plurality into political and institutional
engagement. In other words, contemporary pluralist theory is faced with
not only theorizing diVerence, but also bridging the divide between epi-
stemological and institutional forms of pluralism. This is the point where
contemporary pluralism meets institutional democratic design, in particular
deliberative democracy, for pragmatically addressing the real practice
the pluralist imagination 151