the value of diversity. Too often in liberal societies diVerence is seen as a
problem or hindrance. Pluralism, on the contrary, understands the self-
respect and dignity diversity brings to group members and recognizes the
enrichment it brings to larger cultures. Deveaux criticizes pluralistic liberals
like Raz and Kymlicka for only recognizing the liberalvalue of religious,
ethnic, and cultural identities, as opposed to their greaterpluralisticvalue
( 2000 , 110 ).
Multicultural pluralists attempt to broaden liberalism’s understanding
and recognition of group diVerence, but there is one key lesson from the
Wrst generation of pluralists lost—an increased role for group sovereignty. In
the attempt to reconcile liberalism and pluralism, the focus is often solely on
the institutional tasks and responsibilities of the state. While groups
are discussed as a central place where individuals get meaning, and so should
be protected as such, they are not, as they were for earlier pluralists, a
place where we should have not just autonomy, but sovereignty as well.
Such a step is necessary if we take individual liberty and autonomy seriously
as liberals, and respect group life as pluralists. There is a danger that such a
step which would make pluralism illiberal—multicultural pluralists are
concerned that oVering limited sovereignty to groups might create illiberal
pockets in plural societies. But no pluralist argues that we replace the liberal
state with group sovereignty writ large; statesarenecessary, at the very least,
for the protection of individual rights and autonomy and the protection
of group contexts, if not for the promotion of their speciWc values. Still,
a cultural pluralism based in an expanded liberalism and a resurrection
of respect for groups requires a sharedsovereignty between groups and
the state.
Some pluralists more directly address the importance of this interface.
Many go as far as Galston ( 2002 ) in insisting that a pluralized liberalism
calls for the maximum feasible accommodation of groups, even where there
are internal practices many disagree with. Tully ( 1995 ), perhaps, goes further,
insisting that the politics of cultural recognition is about liberty in the most
enduring sense of the term—the demand for some level of self-rule. Pluralism
in a liberal context, then, means at minimum the political liberty and
autonomy for groups to practice diverse moral beliefs, and the limited
sovereignty to make that liberty meaningful. In essence, it means an integra-
tion of pluralism’s epistemological grounding and ontological valuing of
diVerence with the variety of institutions necessary to express that diVerence
in the social and political realms.
the pluralist imagination 157