Justice (ECJ) to overruling rather than negotiating with national constitu-
tional courts, curtailing a dialogue over rights that has promoted a genuine
European rights culture based on mutual respect for the diverse sources and
meanings they have been given across the continent (Weiler 2000 , 2001 ). This
position, that in certain respects can be aligned to a republican perspective
(Bellamy 2001 ), cuts across both views of political community and takes a
more adaptive stance. Its proponents doubt the likelihood of national com-
munities being displaced by similar allegiances to Europe or the necessity for
the EU to take on many of the tasks of the member states. In the sphere of
rights no less than in economics, both the intrinsic and the instrumental
virtues of a European community are realized through the interaction be-
tween states within the EU framework rather by that framework supplanting
the role of states.
Debates about the Constitution followed a very similar pattern (Magnette
2004 ; Bellamy and Scho ̈nlau 2004 a). Some saw the Constitution as a way of
clearly demarcating and limiting the competences of the EU; others as
providing a legal and principled basis for its further expansion; still others
as a mere reorganization of the existing treaties and an attempt to streamline
decision-making to cope with the expansion of the Union fromWfteen to
twenty-Wve member states. Meanwhile, all had an interest inWnding a way of
deWning which issues ought to be dealt with at what level—the subnational,
national, or European. Since Maastricht, these considerations have been
guided by the linked doctrines of subsidiarity and proportionality, whereby
the EU should only act when it can achieve a policy more eYciently than
some inferior level of government and only to the extent necessary to realize
the aims of an EU Treaty (or now the Constitution). The diYculty has been
that the interpretation of these principles will depend on the view of political
community and the place on the resistant–transformative spectrum of the
interpreter—the principles themselves are unable to adjudicate between rival
interpretations (Føllesdal 1998 ). The attempt to draw up a comprehensive
(and hence limited) list of EU competences necessarily ended in failure.
Instead, the Constitution contains vague formulae and a new monitoring
mechanism that allows national parliaments to challenge the constitutional-
ity of attempts to extend the EU’s competences, although theWnal decision
rests with the ECJ—which, as a federal body, is likely to side with an EU
orientated position. Whether the Constitution proves too rigid or tooXex-
ible, an improvement or a retrograde step, will no doubt also depend on the
views of the commentator concerned. As with the debate on the Charter,
the challenge of european union 251