than successful at putting forward attractive visions of non-liberal societies
appropriate for the modern world. They could score some theoretical points
by urging liberal thinkers to be cautious about developing ‘‘universal’’ argu-
ments founded exclusively on the moral argumentation and political experi-
ence of Western liberal societies, but few thinkers would really contemplate
the possibility of non-liberal practices appropriate for the modern world so
long as the alternatives to liberalism consisted of ancient Greek city-states,
caste societies, fascism, or ‘‘actually-existing’’ communism. For the commu-
nitarian critique of liberal universalism to have any lasting credibility,
thinkers needed to provide compelling counter-examples to modern day
liberal-democratic regimes—and 1980 s communitarians came up short.
Awareness of a ‘‘communitarian’’ alternative to Western-style liberalism
emerged from the East Asian region in the late 1980 s. The economic success of
East Asian countries became so conspicuous as to require explanation. The
need for a new theoretical framework became all the more acute primarily
because social scientists, both liberal and Marxist, failed to predict or explain
the success of these family and community-oriented East Asian states with
Confucian heritages while the Weberian thesis regarding the alleged incom-
patibility between Confucianism and capitalism rapidly lost credibility. Ini-
tially, those who found ‘‘communitarian Confucianism’’ to hold the secret to
the region’s economic success and social stability were mostly Western
scholars (e.g. Vogel 1991 ). Several Asian politicians, however, soon began to
espouse the idea that ‘‘Asian values’’ underpinned the rapid industrialization
of the region, with the apparent aim of celebrating Asian non-individualistic
traditions and justifying constraints on the democratic process. Asians, they
claim, place special emphasis upon family and social harmony, with the
implication that those in the ‘‘chaotic and crumbling societies’’ of the West
should think twice about intervening in Asia for the sake of promoting
human rights and democracy. As Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew put it, Asians
have ‘‘little doubt that a society with communitarian values where the
interests of society take precedence over that of the individual suits them
better than the individualism of America’’ (Lee 1991 ). Such claims attracted
international attention primarily because East Asian leaders seemed to be
presiding over what a United Nations (UN) human development report
called ‘‘the most sustained and widespread development miracle of the
twentieth century, perhaps all history’’ (Crossette 1996 ). In 1997 – 8 , however,
the East Asian miracle seemed to have collapsed. And it looks like ‘‘Asian
values’’ was one casualty of the crisis.
confucianism and anglo-american political theory 265