coherence and political appeal of human rights. For many East Asian intel-
lectuals and social critics, it is important to engage with East Asian traditions
and empirical realities to make human rights truly universal. Consider Joseph
Chan’s proposal:
There are at least two main intellectual approaches to justifying universal human
rights. TheWrst, and more traditional approach is to show that there are universal
values and moral principles which can justify human rights to all reasonable persons.
The second approach tries to seek consensus on human rights from within cultural
perspectives. It encourages diVerent cultures to justify human rights in their own
terms and perspectives, in the hope that an ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ on the norms of
human rights may emerge from self-searching exercises as well as common dialogue.
I shall call theWrst approach the ‘‘fundamentalist’’ approach and the second ‘‘ecu-
menical.’’ (Chan, J. 1999 , 212 ; see also Chan, J. and Liang 2001 , chs. 3 – 6 )
Chan then goes on to test the ‘‘ecumenical’’ approach by examining the case
of Confucianism, arguing that key elements of Confucianism are compatible
with the idea of human rights, although Confucians might have their own
understandings about the justiWcation, scope, and prioritization of human
rights.
Charles Taylor, following an extended period of study in Thailand with
Buddhist practitioners and thinkers, has put forward a similar proposal for
establishing an unforced, cross-cultural consensus on human rights (Taylor
1999 ). He imagines a cross-cultural dialogue between representatives of diVer-
ent traditions. Rather than argue for the universal validity of their views,
however, he suggests that participants should allow for the possibility that
their own beliefs may be mistaken. This way, participants can learn from each
other’s ‘‘moral universe’’. There will come a point, however, when diVerences
cannot be reconciled. Taylor explicitly recognizes that diVerent groups, coun-
tries, religious communities, and civilizations hold incompatible fundamental
views on theology, metaphysics, and human nature. In response, Taylor argues
that a ‘‘genuine, unforced consensus’’ on human rights norms is possible only
if we allow for disagreement on the ultimate justiWcations of those norms.
Instead of defending contested foundational values when we encounter points
of resistance (and thus condemning the values we do not like in other
societies), we should try to abstract from those beliefs for the purpose of
working out an ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ of human rights norms. As Taylor
puts it, ‘‘we would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the
right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by
the diVerences of profound underlying belief ’’ (Taylor 1999 , 124 ).
confucianism and anglo-american political theory 269