approach diVers signiWcantly from that favored by Rawls (Williams 2004 ,
131 – 3 ). On the former view, what qualiWes as misfortune, as well as the
appropriate form and level of redress, is dependent on individuals’ diverse
preferences, amended only to correct for standard cognitive and informa-
tional errors. Rawls’s view, in contrast, does not involve any attempt to mimic
hypothetical market behavior. Indeed, the thought that the type of protection
against misfortune secured by democratic equality is optional seems alien to
his enterprise.
So far, I have constructed a narrative in which Dworkin’s account of
equality of resourcesWgures as an attempt to combine elements from the
apparently deeply opposed views of Rawls and Nozick. My aim has been
largely diagnostic, although admittedly I have taken for granted the implaus-
ibility of Nozick’s own version of historical entitlement theory. I did not
suggest, however, that the brief history so far described is one of progress, in
which Dworkin ingeniously combines the best elements from two opposed
views. Nor did I suggest the history is one of decline, whereby Dworkin
corrupts the luck-sharing project with an excessive zeal for rights in private
property. My remaining remarks explore the latter possibility, whilst also
introducing some of the other egalitarian proposals Dworkin’s view has
generated.
7TheAgencyObjection
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Anti-egalitarians sometimes argue that certain plausible assumptions about
responsible agency, individual liberty, and personal liability provide grounds
to reject egalitarian distributive principles. As an example, consider the
following argument, which I shall term theagency objection:
We are responsible agents, capable of acting freely in a sense that renders our conduct
subject to moral appraisal as blameworthy or commendable. As such, provided we
respect the entitlements of others, we should be at liberty to make our own decisions
about how best to advance our aims. Moreover, under appropriate conditions, it is
unfair to make us liable to bear certain costs arising from others’ decisions, or to
relinquish certain advantages gained through our own eVorts. Egalitarian principles,
however, demand that outcomes remain within a certain range. Consequently,
498 andrew williams