that it is defensible to force some individuals to bear the costs of others’
decisions if doing so is necessary to avoid absolute deprivation without
restricting individual liberty. Since this response countenances cost displace-
ment, I shall refer to it asexternalizing suYcientarianism.
Suppose that compromising suYciency, limiting liberty, and extending
liability are all unpalatable options to some degree, but that the agency
objection shows that egalitarians sometimes must select at least one of these
options. One way to sum up my remarks is to conclude that egalitarians
appear to face a trilemma that invites at least three diVerent responses. The
Wrst post-libertarian response exhibits a (more or less explicit) willingness to
sacriWce suYciency. In sharp contrast, both suYcientarian variants refuse
such a sacriWce. They diVer, however, in the compromises they recommend in
order to safeguard suYciency. Thus, internalizers limit liberty and curtail
liability, whilst externalizers uphold liberty and extend liability.
To illustrate the trilemma, and the diVerences between the post-libertarian,
internalizing, and externalizing responses, consider some individuals who
voluntarily decide to engage in some potentially harmful activity against a
background of equal risk and opportunity. 8 If some urgently need medical
care as a result, post-libertarians are most likely to favor funding it only from
private health insurance, and countenance denying it to those who exercised
an entitlement not to insure. Internalizers and externalizers both reject such a
denial, and supply care even to those who would decide not to insure.
Internalizers, however, will prefer special taxes on the activity, compulsory
insurance, or even outright prohibition, whilst externalizers might fund
medical care through general taxation. Note also that these are pure views.
It is clearly possible to devise impure views, which compromise more than
just one of the three objectives.
Suppose, like the critics of luck egalitarianism, we reject the post-libertarian
willingness to sacriWce suYciency. Even so, we might be unsure about the
relative merits of the internalizing and externalizing suYcientarian responses.
ReXection on actual critiques of post-libertarian egalitarianism is
unlikely to eliminate our doubts. For those critiques normally focus on the
post-libertarian view’s most counter-intuitive implications rather than its
animating assumptions about liberty and liability. Dwelling on that view’s
most apparent defect rather than its underlying appeal, they do not clearly
diVerentiate the two ways of securing suYciency. Nor do they evaluate the
relative importance of individuals possessing powers to make their own choices
rather than enjoying immunities from bearing the costs of others’ choices.
8 For further illustration, see Bou-Habib (forthcoming).502 andrew williams