for toleration. Being tolerant with reference to these practices is deWnitely not
a virtue, but a moral wrong. To sum up: The diVerences which can be proper
candidates for the virtue of tolerance are (a) disliked or disapproved;
(b) important; (c) choosable or revisable; (d) not belonging to the realm of
what is universally condemned. As a result, the moral model of tolerance turns
out to be rather strict in its meaning and scope, because, on the one hand, it
implies only the negative meaning of putting up and non-interference, and, on
the other, it leaves out much of the most relevant and divisive diVerences of
contemporary pluralism, having to do with ascriptive traits, such as race, sex,
nationality, and collective identities, more than with eccentric opinions and
heterodox behavior. One obvious way out is simply to state that ascriptive
diVerences do not Wt into, and therefore do not belong to, theWeld of
tolerance, but pertain to the special domain of anti-discrimination, which
does not concern modiWable behavior or opinions, but identity (Bobbio 1986 ).
Yet, this solution is self-defeating, insofar as it amounts to a declaration of
failure. It is the recognition that the moral theory of toleration cannot cope
with the most relevant and divisive diVerences characterizing contemporary
pluralism. It does not even accommodate the usages of common language,
where tolerance and intolerance refer to racial, sexual, and ethnic diVerences
as much as, if not more often than, diVerences in moral, political, or aesthe-
tical values. In conclusion, the moral model, not being able to capture both
chosen and ascriptive diVerences, cannot constitute the microfoundation for
social and political toleration which is meant to provide a solution for peaceful
and respectful coexistence of many diVerent and potentially conXicting ways
of life, practices, traditions, and cultures.
Alternatively, toleration can be construed as a political principle charac-
terizing the liberal tradition. Contemporary liberalism includes two inXuen-
tial strands which bear on the conception of toleration: neutralist or political
liberalism whose most outspoken representative is John Rawls ( 1971 , 1993 ),
and perfectionist liberalism which has been distinctively outlined by Joseph
Raz ( 1986 ), and then taken up by many others.
The neutralist argument starts from pluralism as a problematic fact, and
then goes on to generalizing the model of political toleration which provided
the solution to the religious wars of early modern Europe. Political toleration
works for peace and civil coexistence, demarcating between matters pertain-
ing to the political order and public aVairs and matters concerning issues that
are irrelevant to order and peace. The latter realm deWnes the private sphere,
566 anna elisabetta galeotti