only as a second best, provided that there is no risk for the social order as
a whole and that no right has been infringed. In this way, perfectionist
liberalism contemplates two notions of toleration: a positive one, as recog-
nition and acceptance, when applied to diVerences thatWt within the bound-
aries of the liberal good; and a negative one, as putting up with, when applied
to diVerences deeply at odds with liberalism, diVerences which it is never-
theless counterproductive or useless to forbid or repress. Accordingly, three
classes of diVerences are implicitly distinguished.First of all, there are the
social diVerences which can be accommodated within the moral outlook of
the liberal order and which allows autonomous personalities to develop. They
are the proper subjects of full liberal toleration. For, they are diVerences
which, whether chosen or received and no matter how socially disliked, are
in principle the subject of autonomous individual choice about what is of
value in life and how life should be lived, which is what commands respect.
Second, there are the social diVerences which are at odds with the liberal
outlook, but which do not threaten the liberal order and do not cause evident
harm to anyone, apart from keeping their bearers in a position of cultural
dependency. Wearing the veil, as many devout Muslim women do, can be an
example of this kind of diVerence, the veil being not only a religious symbol
but also a cultural one, implying women’s subordination and public invisi-
bility. Concerning this second kind of diVerences, toleration in the strong
sense of recognition is out of order for the liberal perfectionist, since the
diVerence in question is not the outcome of an autonomous choice. Their
bearers, in a sense, are considered only potential moral partners, in that they
have not yet developed rational faculties and capacities for autonomy. Yet,
coercion would prove ineVective and ethically too costly: hence these diVer-
ences must be tolerated by default, which implies that they cannot acquire
proper legitimacy in the liberal order, but only a limited space outside the
public domain.Finally, there are the social diVerences which are not only at
odds with the liberal outlook, but which undermine the liberal order and/or
individual rights. DiVerences of this type are intolerable under any interpret-
ation of liberalism and should simply be excluded from the liberal society.
In sum, toleration emerges as dealing with contrasting individual choices,
and it is meant to protect personal liberty from state or third party interven-
tions. By contrast, diVerent collective identities are, in case, only put up with
for lack of viable alternatives and only within the limits of the harm principle.
In this way, liberal perfectionism underlines the limited compatibility of
568 anna elisabetta galeotti