can allegedly be recognized and accepted also by people from alien cultures,
given the neutrality of liberal political legitimacy. Thus openness and inclu-
siveness are a prominent part of the liberal appeal and represent crucial
commitments for liberal justice. Yet, this move towards openness, which
actually underlies the generalization of the ideal of toleration and neutrality
by the constitutional argument, comes down to a fundamental insensitivity
to social diVerences as marks of collective identity and to the issue of their
inclusion, via public recognition, into the public space of liberal polity. The
quest for inclusion of ‘‘diVerent’’ collective identities is in fact perceived by
the neutralist as a breach of public neutrality (either because it entails an
invasion of particular memberships and loyalties in the allegedly neutral
sphere of liberal politics, or because it implies a demand for special consid-
eration in contrast with public blindness). Consequently, the original liberal
promise of openness towards the inclusion of anyone independent of her
origin, culture, language, religion, and race, turns into resistance to accepting
alien or oppressed groups into full citizenship. Such resistance is explained by
the alleged threat to the neutral public sphere represented by groups who do
not accept the principle of neutral citizenship. In other words, it is an
argument for the self-defense of the liberal order. Yet, I contend that this
argument cannot be granted if the liberal state has notWrst made a move
toward inclusion into full citizenship of the marginalized groups, consistent
with its promise of openness. Moreover, the commitment to justice, which is
fundamental and which, in the neutralist perspective, constitutes the ground
for the neutralist conception of toleration, has to face a failure in this respect.
The neutral public sphere, which is strenuously defended against invasion, is
in fact already inhabited by particular and partial identities—those of the
majority—so the rigorous exclusion of diVerent ones soundsXatly unfair.
And to this inequality it is not enough to respond that it is a case of practical
failure, since there are good reasons, conceptually and logically, to suspect
that neutrality can never be absolute.
All three conceptions of toleration considered above come to share the
view that the proper circumstances for toleration are diVerences which can be
reduced to conceptions of the good,held by individuals. Under this reading,
ethnical, linguistic, and cultural diVerences condense into world-views,
engendering incompatible and irreducible moral positions, social practices,
and ways of life. Being an Arab is thus conceptualized as endorsing a certain
religion, beliefs, and morality. This is consistent with the original formulation
by Locke who, for example, stated that being a member of a church was never
identity, difference, toleration 571