recognized the importance of autonomy, which it views as a good to which all
persons have an equal claim. But far from this mandating the assimilation of
cultural minorities into the ways of cosmopolitans in liberal states, respect
and concern for autonomy requires respect and concern for cultural com-
munities, through which the capacity for autonomy is nurtured. The de-
struction of cultural groups could only portend disaster for the lives of those
who are dependent upon such communities to learn what has value, and to
learn the art of making choices.
To protect cultural minorities, Kymlicka suggests recognizing three kinds
of group-diVerentiated rights: ( 1 ) self-government rights, to be enjoyed by
national minorities, such as indigenous peoples, whose communities have
their own ‘‘societal cultures’’ and are able to sustain independent political
structures; ( 2 ) polyethnic rights, to be enjoyed by ethnic minorities, such as
immigrant communities, who have no claim to being allowed to govern
themselves but should be allowed—and enabled—to preserve their cultural
heritage with the help of laws exempting them from some obligations as
citizens, and recognizing their special needs as speakers of diVerent languages
or adherents of diVerent religious faiths; and ( 3 ) special representation rights,
to be made available to groups whose numbers and circumstances warrant
separate provision being made to ensure their access to the political process.
Armed with these rights, Kymlicka thinks, the diVerent groups in a liberal
society would be suitably equipped both to enjoy the protection of their
particular cultural values and to live as citizens in the liberal nation state.
This solution strikes the balance between moral universalism and cultural
diVerence in a particularly interesting way. According to Kymlicka, cultural
groups must be protected from external interference from the outside society
to ensure that they are able to maintain their cohesiveness and integrity.
Without ‘‘external protections,’’ many groups would wither. For example,
without laws restricting the purchase of tribal lands by outsiders some Indian
communities would be undermined, as individual members of the tribe were
tempted to give up their portions for high prices. Without subsidies to sustain
their community services, some cultures would wither. Without special lan-
guage rights, some groups would see their languages decline and their com-
munities disadvantaged. At the same time, however, Kymlicka insists that
cultural protection does not entitle communities to impose ‘‘internal restric-
tions’’ on their members, who remain members of the universal community
and bearers of the rights enjoyed by all citizens. Thus, groups that wish to
restrict the education of women and girls, or attempt to deny freedom of
584 chandran kukathas