(Waldron 1992 ; on rectifying historical injustice see also Kukathas 2003 a;
Ivison, this volume).
For those who adopt the cosmopolitan stance, the claims of cultural
minorities are not to be dismissed, but neither are they to be given the weight
that minorities themselves demand, or that theorists like Kymlicka defend.
Some, like Joseph Raz, for example, argue that the morality of autonomy
cannot license toleration of societies or communities that violate or repudiate
individual autonomy. If such societies are to be tolerated, the justiWcation
must be entirely pragmatic. Intervention in the lives of other people or
communities is an enterprise fraught with danger, and should not be under-
taken lightly. Moral universalists need not be Jacobins in politics (see Raz
1985 , 424 ; Fitzmaurice 1993 , 14 ; see also Levy 2004 ). Nonetheless, there is, for
these theorists, no principled reason for non-intervention: universal prin-
ciples simply trump cultural diVerences.
Some cosmopolitans, however, argue that the issue is not so much one of
whether universal principle should override cultural particularity as one of
discovering what is universal in the particular. Martha Nussbaum is the most
notable exponent of this view, arguing that most, if not all, cultures recognize
certain goods as essential for anyone to live a good life (Nussbaum 1992 , 1993 ,
1995 ). To the extent that they do, all are capable of recognizing our common
humanity, and acknowledging that we are all citizens of the world: cosmopol-
itans. Every culture therefore has its own internal resources from which to draw
to criticize and attack injustice and oppression. In the Third World, no less than
in the First, therefore, women and oppressed minorities can stand up to their
cultures and make claims of justice which are at once universally defensible and
yet locally grounded. Those who would deny them the right to do so in the name
of culture must themselves go against aspects of their own traditions as well as
against universal moral principle. The problem with Nussbaum’s universalism,
however, is that it assumes, mistakenly, that identifying a list of capabilities
desirable for any good human life is suYcient to show that there are universal
values shared by all societies. But what distinguishes communities of value is the
fact that, while they may share a conviction that life, liberty, attachments, and
recreation are important, they interpret and rank these values very diVerently
(for a fuller critique see Ackerly 2000 , 102 – 10 ). To be fair to Nussbaum, however,
she does acknowledge the reality of cultural diVerence and the fact of people’s
attachments to cultural traditions. Moreover she consistently maintains that
the appropriate attitude to take towards other cultures is one of humility
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