5 Deliberative Democracy
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Can respect for diVerence be duly honored within the perspective of a
universalist moral and political theory? The democratic solution oVered by
theorists of deliberative democracy suggests that it can. Seyla Benhabib in
particular has argued that, in the modern world, the deliberative model of
democracy oVers the best prospect of accounting for the kinds of institutions
needed to deal with the salience of cultural diVerence in modern society.
The distinctiveness of the theory of deliberative democracy, according to
Benhabib, lies in ‘‘its vision of the interaction between liberal commitments
to basic human, civil, and political rights, due process of law and democratic
political struggles in civil society’’ (Benhabib 2002 , 114 ). Benhabib herself
oVers a ‘‘two-track model’’ of deliberative democracy according to which
cultural disputes are regulated directly and indirectly by the state, but without
ending the ‘‘dialogue and contestation’’ that is a marked feature of the ‘‘civil
public sphere [that is] essential for a multicultural democratic polity’’
(Benhabib 2002 , 115 ). When disputes arise, for example over laws governing
cultural minorities, it is not enough to argue about whether or not groups
should have cultural rights. What is needed is a political process in which
cultural minorities can put their case. Yet this also means minorities recog-
nizing that they themselves cannot simply demand to be left alone since their
traditions themselves are often under pressure precisely because members of
their communities demand change. Cultural communities must themselves
be willing to take their place in the political process of democratic deliber-
ation. Indeed, for Benhabib, this is something that such communities cannot
escape, since they are notWxed and homogeneous entities but bodies com-
prising diVerent and contesting perspectives. The very boundaries of cultural
communities are not permanently settled but capable of being reconWgured
in the deliberative process.
There are two objections to the deliberative approach, both of which
Benhabib rejects. TheWrst is that the deliberative model is biased to the
extent that it does not accommodate deep diVerences of belief and cultural
practice. In demanding that consensus be sought, it in eVect excludes many
groups that will do poorly when consensus is not reached, as will often be the
case. The second is that deliberative politics itself has limitations that cannot
be overcome if it is to do justice to the need for pluralist cultural power-
sharing arrangements and also to secessionist cultural and nationalist
moral universalism and cultural difference 591