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obligation on the part of any of them to enter into moral association with the
dominant society. A good society is, thus, one that makes room for dissent even
from its deepest commitments. It tolerates diVerence even when diVerences seem
intolerable (for a fuller defense see Kukathas 2003 b).
This is a position that will appear uncongenial to those who attach great
importance to theinclusionof all groups as properly ‘‘recognized’’ members
of a single moral community. It will also be rejected by those who consider
some groups worthy not of toleration (let alone recognition) but of moral
condemnation for their failure to abide by the universal standards of moral-
ity. The virtue of this position, however, is that it does not compel those who
repudiate the moralities of particular groups to embrace them. Nor does it
compel those groups who dissent from prevailing standards to embrace those
who reject them. The cost, however, is that groups can be oVered no assur-
ance that they will survive; and the moral majority can be oVered no
assurance that the universal morality will prevail universally.
In practical terms, it must however be conceded that it is hard to expect
that such a view willWnd many adherents. It demands a level of toleration
that most states, liberal democratic or otherwise, willWnd diYcult to sustain.


7 The International Dimension
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In some respects, the trend of contemporary discussion is moving precisely in
the other direction. In international political theory, the tide is moving with
those who argue that universal standards of justice should hold across the globe,
and that political institutions should be established to ensure that distribu-
tional inequalities are reduced or eliminated, and that oppressive or simply
illiberal regimes are pressured to conform to global moral standards. Charles
Beitz, for example, has argued that the standards of justice defended by John
Rawls inATheory of Justice(Rawls 1971 ) could serve as a standard not only for all
societies but for justice between societies (Beitz 1979 ; see also Pogge 1989 , 2002 ).
Rawls himself has dissented from this view, arguing inThe Law of Peoples
(Rawls 1999 ) that the principles of justice do not extend to international
society, which must be governed by diVerent principles altogether. In this,
however, he seems to have retreated from any kind of commitment to moral


594 chandran kukathas

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